University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

8-1-1975

The Ticket-Splitter: A New Psephos in the American Electorate
Thomas A. Godzala

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Godzala, Thomas A., "The Ticket-Splitter: A New Psephos in the American Electorate" (1975). Theses and
Dissertations. 2791.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2791

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator
of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

THE TICKET-SPLITTER: A NEW PSEPHOS
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

by
Thomas A, Godzala
Bachelor of Arts, Saint Cloud State College, 1973

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota
August
1975

This Thesis submitted by Thomas A. Godzala in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of
Arts from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved
by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has
been done.
\

ii

Permission

Title:

The Ticket-Splitter: A New Psephos in the
American Electorate

Department:

Political Science

Degree:

Master of Arts

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for a graduate degree from the University
of North Dakota, I agree that the Library of this Univer
sity shall make it freely available for inspection.
I
further agree that permission for extensive copying for
scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who
supervised my thesis work or, in his absence, by the
Chairman of the Department or the Dean of the Graduate
School. It is understood that any copying or publication
or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial
gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
It is also understood that due recognition shall be given
to me and to the University of North Dakota in any
scholarly use which may be made of any material in my
thesis.

Signature
Date

July 23, 1975

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this thesis, I am greatly indebted to
Professor Lloyd B. Omdahl, Professor Theodore B. Pedeliski,
and Professor D. Jei'ome Tweton who, as members of my Advisory
Committee, took time from their busy schedules to offer me
-their erudite knowledge and scholarly guidance.
In addition, I wish to acknowledge the generosity of
the Bureau of Governmental Affairs at the University of North
Dakota for making available to me their survey data informa
tion.. I further wish to thank Professor Ronald W. Matheny
and Cathy Steitz for their expert assistance in writing and
preparing computer programs for this thesis. I am also
•extremely grateful to Professor William A. Hazleton whose
editorial expertise greatly improved the style and content of
this thesis.
Finally, a special thanks to Bridget, to whom I dedicate
this thesis, who masqueraded as my wife but actually performed
as an editor and a typist.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ......................................

iv

List

of T a b l e s ................... ....................vii

List

of Illustrations.................................... ix

Abstract . ........................ . ..................
Chapter I.
Chapter II.

Chapter III.

Chapter IV.

x

THE EMERGING TICKET-SPLITTER ..............
The Rate and Rangeof Split-Ticket Voting.

1
6

STUDIES DEALING WITH THE CLASSIFICATION
OF THE SPLIT-TICKET V O T E R ................... 20
What is Meant by the Traditional
Independent............................ 21
Recognizing the Distinctiveness of
the Ticket-Splitter.................... 24
A TEST OF INDEPENDENCE: THE NORTH
DAKOTA TICKET-SPLITTER .......... . . . .
Partisan Patterns in NorthDakota.
...
The Phenomenon of Ticket-Splitting
in North Dakota. .......................
Socio-economic Characteristics of
the North Dakota Ticket-Splitter . . .

48
49
61
69

DETERMINANTS THAT PROMOTE THE BALLOT
SPLITTING PHENOMENON................... 83

Appendices.......................

99

Appendix A.

Terms that Designate Different Kinds
of Independent Voting . .................... 100

Appendix B.

The Party Identification of the
Electorate (1940-1972)................

102

Appendix C.

A Paradigm of Voting in State

Appendix D.

DeVries and Tarrance's Voting Option
Scheme................

105

Citizens Advisory Survey: Bureau of
Governmental Affairs'University of North
Dakota. ........................

106

Appendix E.

v

"X". . . . .

103

Appendix F.

1972 North Carolina Ballot. . .............109

Selected Bibliography.................................. 110

LIST OF TABLES
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Congressional Districts with Split Election
Results: Districts Carried by a Presidential
Candidate and a U.S. House Candidate of
Different Parties, 1900-1968 ....................
11
Split Outcomes in Gubernatorial and U.S.
Senatorial Elections: 1914-1970..................
13
States with Both Gubernatorial and Senatorial
Elections in 1970 Who Chose a Republican
for one Office and a Democrat (or Conserva
tive in New York) for the Other.................. 15
Percentage Difference Between the Winning
Ceindidate for Governor and his Running
Mate for the Senate in States Where Both
Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections
Occured in 19 70..................................
16
Republican and Democratic Election Outcomes
in State Senate and House Races in North
Dakota: 1900-1974................................
50
Vote for Governor Compared (Plus or Minus)
with Vote for President. ........................... 56
Disparity Between Self-Perception and
Behavior Illustrated by the 1974 North
Dakota Pre-Election Survey ......................
65
Combined Statistics for Self-Perception and
Actual Voting Behavior from the 1974 North
Dakota Pre-Election Survey .
66
1967 National S u r v e y .................................67
Social/Economic Profiles of Behavioral
Republicans, Democrats, and TicketSplitters in North Dakota (1974)...............
70
The North Dakota Ticket-Splitter
Profile (1974) . . . . . ...........................72
Relationship Between Selected SocioEconornic Characteristics and Level
of Ticket-Splitting..........................
73
The National Ticket-Splitter Profile ...............
80
Social/Economic Profiles of North Dakota
Voters Based upon Perception and
Behavior (1974)............... ... ...............
81
The Decline of Party: Movements in Party
Identification, 1940-1969........................
85
The Decline of Party: Evidences from
Survey Data, 1948-1966 ..........................
88
Straight and Split-Ticket Voting for U.S.
Senator and Governor by Type of Conflict/
Support Condition...................................94
vii

18* The Party Identification of the Electorate
(1940-1972). ......................... .

viil

102

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
How Actual Voters in North Dakota Consider
Themselves (1974) . . ................

ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the emergence of a new force in
the American electorate: The Ticket-Splitter.

The ticket-

splitter as a contemporary psephos or voting pebble has
filled the ballot box at all election levels during the past
two decades with a decision that verifies the sudden and per
sistent growth of ticket-splitting.

Moreover,, this increased

ballot-splitting has minimized the strength and influence of
the two major political parties.

But who actually is this

ticket-splitter?
In the past, most voting behavior studies have relied
on the self-classification by respondents from surveys in
order to obtain the overall political identification of the
American electorate.

In other words, all voters are politi

cally classified by simply stating whether they thought of
themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or independents.

Con

sequently, the Democratic and Republican identifiers epitomized
those voters who voted a straight party ticket and the inde
pendents represented an independence in their voting habits
because they crossed over party lines.
This thesis contends, however, that the self-perception
method no longer proves to be an accurate means for identify
ing the political allegiance of voters.

The new methodolo

gical approach utilized by this thesis to determine the real
x

political identity of an individual is based upon how one
actually votes and not how one perceives himself.

Therefore,

this study asserts the belief that crossover voting is an
ubiquitous force and that ballot-splitters tested by the
actual behavior method espouse specific socio-economic char
acteristics .
A test of this assertion was made by focusing on the
voters of North Dakota.

According to a survey questionnaire,

the North Dakota electorate substantiated the discrepancy
between self-perception and actual voting behavior.

It was

discovered that the ticket-splitter is basically a Republican
or Democrat who abandons partisan allegiance on a ballot by
voting for a candidate of the opposite party.

Many of the

independents, moreover, were found to have voted a straight
party ticket.
In addition, the North Dakota ticket-splitter can be
identified by specific demographic characteristics.

These

socio-economic features, compared to a national survey,
undoubtedly conceptualize this new voter's personality and
supports the contention that ballot-splitting is a nationwide
force by being identifiable even in a one-party state.
Finally, this thesis presents some of the basic determinants
which have promoted the phenomenal practice of ballot
splitting .

xi

CHAPTER I
THE EMERGING TICKET-SPLITTER
Psephology, which is the scientific study of elec
tions, was coined by R. B. McCallum of Oxford University in
1952.

Psephology is derived from the Greek word psephos.

A psephos was a pebble used by the ancient Greeks for voting
purposes.

A Greek citizen would cast his vote by dropping a.

colored pebble or psephos into their equivalent of our ballot
box.

The selection of a particular colored pebble, no doubt,

revealed the allegiance or actual political behavior of each
individual.
Putting this idea into a contemporary framework, this
thesis will examine a new, decisive force in American elec
tions.

Emptying our ballot boxes we will tally the credi

bility and strength of a modern psephos or voting pebble:
The Ticket-Splitter.^

Like the Greek custom of voting, we

will know the political behavior or identity of the ticketsplitter because of his synonymy with his vote.
A clearer understanding of this new voter's political
pei'sonaiity is illuminated by Dana L. Spitzer, a reporter
^Tn this thesis, a variety of names such as crossover
voter, ballot-splitter, unattached vote, split-ticket voter,
and inconstancy of party allegiance will be used interchange
ably with the term ticket-splitter.
1

2
for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Mr. Spitzer reported the
following story during the 1972 campaign:
When 16 year old Elaine Briggs went into Democratic
headquarters in Florissant a few weeks ago, she was
planning to volunteer her time and energy to the cam
paign. But she was surprised to find that the head
quarters did not want her.
Rebuffed, she left with a bad taste for Democrats.
Like many others her age, Elaine is an enthusiast
of Senator George McGovern, the Democratic nominee for
President.
And like many others her age, she supports State
Auditor Christopher S. (Kit) Bond, the Republican nomi
nee for Governor, and a few other Republicans for state
offices.
Elaine's problem at the Democratic headquarters was
the "Bond for Governor" button she was wearing on her
blouse. When the man in charge saw it, she said, he
told her she could not support the Democrats if she were
supporting Bond. . . .
To Elaine, whose attitudes about politics are simi
lar to those of her parents, the idea of straight party
voting is ridiculous. . . .
Voting patterns in St. Louis County indicate that
the Briggs family is typical of voters there, where about
400,000 ballots are expected to be cast in the Nov. 7
election. The county's record of ticket-splitting indi
cates that a candidate's party has less to do with suc
cess than other factors. . . .
St. Louis County, because of its size and voting
behavior, is probably the single most important political
target in Missouri this year. For that reason the expe
rience of Elaine at Democratic headquarters and the atti
tudes of her parents toward politics take on a broader
significance.“
This new voter's personality has far reaching signifi
cance and consequences for the political scene when he is
identified as the source of independence and not strictly as
an independent voter.

In the past, independence in voting

and the independent voter have been thought of as one and the
same thing.

At the same time, there has been a propensity

2
.
.
'Dana Spitzer. Ticket-Splitting Grows in St. Louis
County (Areata Microfilm Corp., NewsBank, Political Development, Card 223, October 1972), pp. E4-5.
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to identify the independent voter and the ticket-splitter as
one and the same voter.

In other words, the independent

voter epitomized independence by splitting his ballot.
Because of this intertwined personality, the real character
of the ticket-splitter has had difficulty trying to emerge.
The thing that exacerbated and tended to conceal the true
identity of the ballot-splitter is the fact that since 1936,
when George Gallup first began measuring the independent,
the respondents interviewed were simply asked to identify
themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or independents.

From

this self-identification pattern arose the means for all
future classification of those voters not connected with the
two major parties.

This simply meant that you were either a

party member or an independent which left no room for a
category of true independence.

3

But some researchers did have objections to the inde
pendent being defined by his own perception or selfclassification.

Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance argued

that the flaw of earlier studies was their use of Gallup's
^For further deciphering of the traditional independent
vis-a-vis with the ticket-splitter see Chapter II; also, see
Appendix A for a glossary of terms describing independent
voting.

4
interviewing procedure.^

According to DeVries and Tarrance,

identification of oneself politically cannot be based upon
self-administered perception but rather it must be inferred
by the individual's actual behavior.

The problem stated

by DeVries and Tarrance is that
. . . while the political scientist and other
scholars in social psychology may find it interesting to
know how a voter identifies himself, this does not help
him explain how the voter's total voting behavior is
related to his self-perceptions. The voter must be
asked how he actually behaves in the voting booth— and
with respect to all major political offices, not just
the Presidency. The traditional measurement of party
identification as the major determinant of voting has
not been as precise and as meaningful as some would have
us believe. If a questionnaire is to determine true
independence, it must ask the voter not how he identifies
4

Earlier studies asked this primary question to obtain
a measurement of self-classified party identification:
"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Fur
ther classification was obtained by asking the Republi
cans and Democrats, "Would you call yourself a strong
(Republican, Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican,
Democrat)?" Likewise, classification of the Independents
was extended by asking them, "Do you think of yourself as
closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"
The above type of classification in its early stages was
first discussed in George Belnap and Angus Campbell,
"Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign
Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly 15 (Winter 1952):601-523.
The formulation of the above questions and the most accepted
and honored work on the measurement, impact, and development
of party identification is in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 120-1677
Furthermore, the authors of The American Voter pursued the
theme of political identification with a more extensive anal
ysis in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political
Order (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9-627”
5
Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket Split
ter: A New Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 48-55.

5
himself but how he actually voted.

6

To come to grips with the ticket-splitter the independent
voter must not be confused with the ticket-splitter.
DeVries and Tarrance separate the independent from the
ticket-splitter by identifying the ticket-splitter through
his actual voting behavior.

Collaborating with DeVries and

Tarrance, this thesis accepts the division between the selfproclaimed independent and the behaviorally determined
ticket-splitter.
This dichotomy obviously leads us to the defining of
this newly emerged voter.

For the purpose of this study, we

will adopt the definition of the ticket-splitter put forth
by DeVries and Tarrance.

The term ticket-splitter obviously

is not a newly invented name, but, as far as their definition
goes, it truly denotes a new force or "new construct" in
American politics.

DeVries and Tarrance’s ticket-splitter,

unlike the traditional independent, is an involved voter who
rationally splits his ballot from President to state legis
lative races.

What’s more, unlike the independent who

refuses to be identified with either party, the ticketsplitter is basically a Republican or Democrat who abandons
partisan allegiance on a ballot by voting for a candidate of
the opposite party.

7

However, this does not exclude the fact

that there is a certain overlap between the independent voter
^Ibid., p. 49.
^Ibid., p. 37.
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and the ticket-splitter.

Nevertheless, DeVries and Tarrance's

definition meant unequivocally and explicitly that the genuine
test of independence is not whether you call yourself an
independent but rather if you voted independently.
Consequently, these political analysts put on their
potters wheel a conglomeration of independents, Democrats,
and Republicans and from this amalgam they molded the con
temporary ticket-splitter.

The critic that judges this

ballot-splitter for authenticity of independence must use as
his criterion the actual performance of splitting one's vote.
The Rate and Range of Split-Ticket Voting
The saliency of crossover voting is beginning to
establish the claim that if ticket-splitting abruptly ended,
it would be "un-American.1,8

Moreover, many political

scientists agree with Sally Merrill, associate professor of
political science at Indiana University, when she says, "the
balance of power in the political arena is shifting from the
9
hard core party regular to the so-called ticket-splitter."
The statement made by Professor Merrill and other similar
pronouncements are quite startling and have significant impli
cations for political parties if we consider that American
elections in the past have been the apogee of partisanship.
g

Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of
Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960),
p. 187.
q
Kirk Stone. More Voters Splitting (Areata Microfilm
Corp., NewsBank, Political Development, Card 191, September
1972), p. Bll.
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One such implication is that, at the very least, parties
are prognosticated to play a subservient role in American
electoral politics..

More specifically, the obsequious con

dition designated for political parties might end the reign
of party membership or identification as the major determi
nant of voting behavior.

The most devastating prediction

for parties i.s a -gradual withering away that might eventually
lead to a complete break-down.'*'0

It would be unfair and

inaccurate to say that ticket-splitters are the sole cause
fox the deterioration of our major parties.

But there can

be no doubt that the role of political parties amidst a surge
of ticket-splitting will raise serious questions concerning
our political system.

The outlook for political parties is

indeed grave and the ramifications ticket-splitting will have
on our two major parties is covered in greater detail in the
final chapter of this thesis,^ but for now we must resume
our discussion of trends in ballot-splitting.
Voting studies that analyzed the American electorate in
the past usually revealed a high incidence of identification
by voters with the two political parties.

Party members

identified by .self-perception, at times, ranged as high as
30
Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Poli
tics,'" in The American Political Arena, 3d ed., ed. Joseph R.
Eiszman and Gene S . Poschman (Boston: "Little, Brown and Com
pany, 1972), pp, .248-260,
]Ipor a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 83-88
below.

8
80 percent until post-World War II years.

During the

1950's, the strength of party identification was shown to
range m

the mid-seventies with little fluctuation. 13

Throughout the 1960's and the early 1970's, many political
scientists continued to preserve the widespread view that
party membership was in vogue (for a complete set of data on
party identification from 1940-1972 see Appendix B); they
also portrayed partisanship as a highly stable pattern for
]4
the American voter.
For example, political scientist
William Flanigan expressed agreement with party popularity
and stability:
During the past twenty years, while there have been land
slide elections for both parties in Presidential and Con
gressional elections, party loyalty has remained almost
unchanged. The general sympathy for, and identification
with, the two political parties has shown remarkably
little fluctuation during this period of considerable
shifting in aggregate voting behavior.15
As a consequence of strong party attachment, a premise was
established that said party identification has a considerable
12

George Gallup and the American Institute of Public
Opinion Staff, comps., The Political A lmanac, 1952 (New York:
B.C. Forbes and Sons Publishing Co.,' Inc.', 1952), p. 37.
13
See Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 124,
table 6-1; and Campbell et al., Elections and the Political
Order, p. 13, table 2-1.
14
Most studies that focus on party membership and the
stability of that identification rely on the views expressed
in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 120-167.
15
William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the Amer
ican Electorate, 2d ed., (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.,
1972), p. 36.
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impact on the voter's behavior.

3. 6

From this premise it was

concluded that party attachments lead to a consistency of
17
straight-ticket voting.
But here is where the problem
lies.

When party commitment through self-perception runs

high, is it really an indication that straight-ticket voting
will be as prevalent?
Despite what has been said about the high incidence
of party identification and the relationship of straightticket voting to that identification, the significant obser
vation during the past years has been the remarkable down
ward percentage of straight-ticket voters.

This is not to

say that there has been a substantial decrease in the number
who classified themselves as partisans or that partisan
stability is constantly eroding, but rather it is saying that
there was a notable drop in the number of voters who voted a
straight-ticket.

The reduction in the amount of straight

voting became manifested in the simultaneous rise of ticketsplitters.

Even though the Survey Research Center at the

University of Michigan depicted straight-ticket voting as an
impressive force during the 1950's and 1960's, they released
information which showed that 33 percent of the voters in the
1952 presidential race split their ticket and that 43 percent
split their ballot in the 1956 presidential election. 18
^Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 136-142.
17
Ibid., p. 125, table 6-2.
"University of Michigan Reports Rise in Split-Tickets
and Drop in Balloting by Blocs," New York Times, 24 February
1957, p. 67.

10
Amazingly, while the Survey Research Center listed the party
identification of the electorate in 1968 as 69 percent,
George Gallup's post-election poll in 1968 stated that 54
percent of the American voters had voted a split-ticket and
•,
19
that only 43 percent voted a straight-ticket.
At first, the increase in ticket-splitting was usually
identified according to the proportion of split results
between the President and the U.S. House of Repsresentatives.
In the case of Edward Cox and Milton Cummings, both using
the difference in votes between the President and the U.S.
House of Representatives, they revealed an increasing tend
ency toward ballot-splitting over the years and the upward
pn
trend was especially prominent following World War II.
DeVries and Tarrance also emphasized the dilation of ticket
splitting in Federal elections.

In the table below (see

Table 1), they adopted Cummings's method of measurement for
split outcomes at the congressional-district level.

It seems

apparent from Table 1 that over the succession of years there
19Gallup's survey question asked the respondents, "For
various political offices, did you vote for all the candidates
of one party--that is, a straight ticket, or did you vote for
the candidates of different parties?" Notice that straightticket and split-ticket voting was not inferred from the
respondent's self-classification. George Gallup, The Gallup
Poll, American Institute of Public Opinion, 3 vols. (New York:
Random House, 1935-71) , 3 (1972) :2171-2172.
20

See Edward F. Cox, "The Measurement of Party Strength"
Western Political Quarterly 13 (1960):1022-1042; Edward F. Cox,
Voting in Postwar Federal Elections: A Statistical Analysis of
Party Strength Since 1945 (Dayton, Ohio: University Publica
tions, Wright State University, 1968); and Milton C. Cummings,
Jr., Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U.S.
House and the President, 1920-1964 (New York: The Free Press,
1966), pp. 28-55.
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TABLE 1
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WITH SPLIT ELECTION RESULTS:
DISTRICTS CARRIED BY A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
AND A U.S. HOUSE CANDIDATE OF DIFFERENT
PARTIES, 1900-1968
Year & Party
of Winning
Presidential
Candidate
190 OR
1904R
1908R
1912D
1916D
1920R
1924R
1923R
193 2D
1936D
194 0D
194 4D
1948D
1952R
1956R
1960D
1964D
1968R

Number of
Districts

Number of
Districts
With Split
Results

Percent
Split
Election
Results

295
310
314
333
333
344
356
359
355
361
362
367
422
435
435
437
435
435

10
5
21
84
35
11
42
68
50
51
53
41
90
84
130
114
145
139

3.2
1.6
6.8
25.2
10.5
3.2
11.8
18.9
14.1
14.1
14.6
11.2
21.3
19.3
29.9
26.1
33.3
31.6

SOURCES: This table is a composite of Walter Dean
Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 1.09,
table 5.4; and Milton Cummings, Congressmen and the Elec
torate: Elections for the U.S. House and the President,
1920-3964 (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 32, table
2-1, cited by Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The
Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eedmans Publishing Company,
1972), p. 30.
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has been a steady but soaring growth of ticket-splitting.
Furthermore, Table 1 has been pushed back to 1900 to make
it evident that contemporary trends in ticket-splitting
could be dated as far back as 1916.

Also, one may assume

that the rate of split-ticket voting for the first two elec
tions of this series is indicative of the split results for
the nineteenth century. 23
While DeVries and Tarrance acknowledged the growing
trend of ticket-splitting at the national level, they added
impetus to the awareness of the crossover voter by maintain
ing that ticket-splitting is a phenomenon practiced at the
state level as well (see Table 2).

After surveying Table 2,

there can be little doubt that in the past thirty years,
ticket-splitting has been practiced with increased enthusiasm
in statewide elections between the governor and the U.S. Sena
tor.

But their analysis does not stop there.

They produced

evidence showing that ticket-splitting patterns permeated all
22
levels of state government.*'
Looking back over the 1960's and the early 1970's,
what political observer would have had the intuition to prog
nosticate the impact the ticket-splitter would have on elec
tions during those years?

The electoral tide of ticket-

splitting during those years could be seen in numerous
21

Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Main
springs of American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Corrr
pany, 1970), p. 108.
22

DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 30-36.
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TABLE 2
SPLIT OUTCOMES IN GUBERNATORIAL AND U.S.
SENATORIAL ELECTIONS: 1914-1970

Year

States with
Simultaneous
Elections

Numbers of
Split Outcomes

Percent: Split
Outcomes

1914
1916
1918
1920

22
24
22
24

6
5
1
0

27.3
20.8
4.5
0.0

1922
1924
1926
1928
1930

22
26
24
24
24

5
1
4
4
5

22.7
3.8
16.7
16.7
20.8

1932
193 4
1936
1938
1940

23
22
24
24
26

3
3
2
4
11

13.0
13.6
8.3
16.7
42.3

1942
1944
1946
1948
1950

23
22
24
22
24

3
6
1
4
5

13.0
27.3
4.2
18.2
20.8

1952
1954
1956
1958
1960

22
25
20
22
19

6
6
3
4
5

27.3
24.0
15.0
18.2
36.3

1962
1964
1966
1968
1970

27
18
22
15
24

12
10
13
9
11

44.4
55.6
59.1
60.0
45.8

SOURCE: Howard Reiter, Harvard University, John
ald Kennedy School of Government, March 1969, cited
DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter:
Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
B. Eedmans Publishing Company, 1972), p. 31.

Fitzger
by Waite
A New
William
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examples of crossover voting.

In the 1964 election, while

President Lyndon B. Johnson won in the state of Michigan
with 66.8 percent of the vote, Republican George Romney
tallied an impressive 56.1 percent in the gubernatorial race.
Dramatic voting patterns in Arkansas in 1966 produced George
Wallace as victor in the capturing of the presidential vote
while Democrat J. William Fullbright retained his U.S.
Senate seat and Republican Winthrop Rockefeller returned to
the governorship.

In the "lone star" state in 1966, Demo

cratic governor John Connally easily won with a plurality
of 669,500 votes, but amazingly, Republican John Tower was
2^
elected U.S. Senator with a plurality of 198,000 votes.
Further illustrations of ballot-splitting can be seen
from Table 3 indicating that the popularity of ticket
splitting continued to thrive in the 1970 election.

Table 3

lists 11 of 23 states in which splits occured between a
governor from one party and a U.S. Senator from another.
The 1970 ticket-splitting pattern is consistent with the two
previous off-year elections.

In 1966, 13 of 23 states

divided the offices of governor and U.S. Senator between a
Republican and a Democrat; and in 1962 the same pattern of
crossover voting occured in 12 of 26 states.^
Another indication of widespread split-ticket voting
in the 1970 election is evident even when the same party won
z^Ibid., p. 20.

24"ig7o voting Patterns: Widespread Ticket-Splitting,"
Congressional. Quarterly 29 (2 July 1971):1440.
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both the gubernatorial and the senatorial race.

The percen

tage of votes for the victorious candidate of one office mayrange much higher than the percentage obtained by his politi
cal affiliate.

For example, in Wisconsin, Democrat Patrick
TABLE 3

STATES WITH BOTH GUBERNATORIAL AND SENATORIAL ELECTIONS
IN 1970 WHO CHOSE A REPUBLICAN FOR ONE OFFICE
AND A DEMOCRAT (OR CONSERVATIVE IN
NEW YORK) FOR THE OTHER
'

State

Governor

Alaska
Calif.
Hawaii
Md.
Mass.
Mich.
Neb.
N. Y.
Ohio
Pa.
Wyo.

Egan(D)
Reagan(R)
Burns(D)
Mandel(D)
Sargent(R)
Milliken(R)
Exon (D)
Rockefeller(R)
Gilligan(D)
Shapp(D)
Hathaway(R)

Percent
of Vote
52.4
52.8
57.6
65.7
56.7
50.4
53.9
52.4
54.2
55.2
62.8

Percent
of Vote

Senator
Stevens(R)
Tunney(D)
Fong(R)
Beall Jr.(R)
Kennedy(D)
Hart(D)
Hruska(R)
Buckley(Cons-R)
Taft Jr.(R)
Scott(R)
McGee(D)

59.6
53.9
51.6
50.7
62.2
66.8
52.5
38.8
4 9.7
51.4
55.8

SOURCE: "1970 Voting Patterns: Widespread TicketSplitting," Congressional Quarterly 29 (2 July 1971):1440.
Lucey was elected governor with 54.2 percent of the vote
while Democrat William Proxmire garnered 70.8 percent of the
vote in the senatorial contest.

The difference in vote

totals is a surprising 16.6 percent (see Table 4).

In addi

tion, the large percentage difference between the winning
candidate for governor and the winning or losing senatorial
nominee denotes a surge of ticket-splitting.

Conversely, a

low percentage of difference would indicate a minimum of
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WINNING CANDIDATE
FOR GOVERNOR AND IIIS RUNNING MATE FOR THE SENATE
IN STATES WHERE BOTH GUBERNATORIAL AND
SENATORIAL ELECTIONS OCCURED IN 1970
State

Governor

N.Y.
Rockefeller(R)
Mass.
Sargent(R)
Wyo.
Hathaway(R)
Md.
Mandel(D)
Mich.
Milliken(R)
R. I.
Licht (D)
Wis.
Lucey(D)
Conn.
Meskill(R)
Alaska Egan(D)
Maine
Curtis(D)
Pa.
Shapp(D)
Nev.
O 'Callaghan(D)
Hawaii Burns(Dj
Calif. Reagan(D)
Ohio
Gilligan (D)
Neb.
Exon(D)
Ariz.
Williams(R)
Minn.
Anderson(DFL)
Fla.
Askew(D)
Vt.
Davis(R)
N.M.
King(D)
Tenn.
Dunn(R)
Texas
Smith(D)

Dif.

Senator
52.4%
56.7
62.8
65.7
50.4
50.1
54.2
53.8
52.4
50.1
55.2
48.1
57.6
52.8
54.2
53.9
50.9
54.0
56.9
57.0
51.3
52.0
53.6

Goodell(R)*
Spaulding(R)*
Wold(R)*
Tydings(D)*
Romney(R)*
Pastore(D)
Proxmire(D)
Weicker(R)
Kay (D)*
Muskie(D)
Sesler(D)*
Cannon(D)
Heftel(D)*
Murphy(R)*
Metzenbaum(D)*
Morrison(D)*
Fannin(R)
Humphrey(DFL)
Chiles(D)
Prouty(R)
Montoya(D)
Brock(R)
Bentsen(D)

24.3%
37.0
44.2
48.1
32.9
67.5
70.8
41.7
40.4
61.7
45.4
57.6
48.4
44.3
47.4
47.5
56.0
57.8
53.9
58.9
52.3
51.3
53.5

28.1%
19.7
18.6
17.6
17.5
17.4
16.6
12.1
12.0
11.6
9.8
9.5
9.2
8.5
6.8
6.4
5.1
3.8
3.0
1.9
1.0
0.7
0.1

SOURCE: "1970 Voting Patterns: Widespread TicketSplitting," Congressional Quarterly 29 (2 July 1971):1440.
*An asterisk identifies losers in Senate races.
splitting or straight party voting.
From the deluge of crossover voting flows the 1972 elec
tion as the last ticket-splitting wave for this chapter.

In

Florida, the Republicans won only one out of three new House
seats while the Nixon-Agnew team was victorious in all 67

17
Florida counties? their vote was an astonishing 72 percent.
Massachusetts, which is the only state that gave George
McGovern a plurality, re-elected Republican Senator Edward
W. Brooke.

The incompatible arrangement in Illinois had

Republican Governor Richard B. Ogilvie going down in defeat
while former President Nixon emerged with 60 percent of the
25
vote or a plurality of 900,000 votes.
Finally, it should
be noted that these are not isolated examples generated from
the 1972 election.

In spite of President Nixon's landslide

victory, several Democratic senatorial and gubernatorial
nominees triumphed because of the increased and accepted
practice of ballot-splitting.

While Mr. Nixon won all 33

states that conducted senatorial races, 17 of these states
elected a Democratic U.S. Senator.

This massive pattern of

ticket-splitting was also apparent in the gubernatorial
races.

Again, Mr. Nixon carried all 18 states that held

gubernatorial races.

However, out of these 18 states, 11

elected Democratic governors.

In 12 states that voted for

all three offices— President, senator, and governor— only in
one state (North Carolina) did the voters select the same
2 6

party affiliation (Republican) for all three offices.^

In summary, the abundance of ticket-splitting clearly
suggests some basic changes in American voting behavior.
25

"The Way People Voted— and Why," U.S. News and World
Report, 20 November 1972, p. 16.
yr
"Ticket-Splitting: Heavy Despite Nixon Landslide,"
Congressional Quarterly 30 (11 November 1972):2985.
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Psephological analyses of election results from the past two
decades, with emphasis on the 1960's and early 1970's, has
chisled the emergence of a freshly sculptured force in Amer
ican politics.

The goal of this thesis will be to display

this independent voter (i.e., ticket-splitter) so we can
view as many detailed dimensions and characteristics as
possible.

More specifically, this thesis will attempt to

reaffirm and add some new ideas about the nature and source
of a group of voters who are considered to hold the balance
of power m

any particular election. 27

It differs from most

studies because it uses DeVries and Tarrance's behavioral
approach to describe the predominant voter of independence.
An examination of this contemporary psephos will pave the
way for a more accurate and thorough understanding of Amer
ican politics.
In our particular case, however, we will examine
North Dakota's ticket-splitter.

The validity, strength and

political identity (i.e., comprised in what degree by Demo
crats, Republicans, and independents) of this ticket-splitter
will be concluded from the analyzation of survey data
•acquired before the 1974 election.

Furthermore, added to

this ticket-splitter's presumed credibility will be the reveal
ing of his socio-economic traits.

The North Dakotan's demo

graphic characteristics will then be compared to a national
ticket-splitter profile.
27

These comparisons will undoubtedly

To understand how ticket-splitters can control the
outcome of elections, see the paradigm in Appendix C.
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conceptualize the political personality of the North Dakota
ticket-splitter.

However, before attempting such a critical

analysis in Chapter III, it would be advantageous for the
reader to be confronted with the past endeavors on the
classification of the split-ticket voter in Chapter II.

CHAPTER II
STUDIES DEALING WITH THE CLASSIFICATION
OF THE SPLIT-TICKET VOTER
For any person to really know himself and to accept
his existence he must know his identity and the heritage of
that identity.

Like a tenacious orphan child searching for

his identification, this chapter will trace the nebulous
heritage of the ticket-splitter.

As has already been men

tioned in Chapter I, the ticket-splitter's genealogy is
plagued by bewilderment, because the identity of the ticketsplitter has been usurped by the independent.

If you remem

ber, independence of choice was determined by the classifi
cation of oneself as an independent voter and not as a ticketsplitter.

The self-proclaimed independent stood for all

citizens who split their vote.

Because of the integrated

relationship between the ticket-splitter and the independent,
most early efforts to uncover the true nature of the ticketsplitter were really an exercise dealing with the categori
zation of the independent.

Nevertheless, the best way to

start, and the first cue to the ticket-splitter, is through
the independent.

The explication of the split-ticket voter

cannot be accomplished without the continuous appearance of
the independent.

The reader would be handicapped if he did
20
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not thoroughly understand the assumptions and the generali
zations regarding the existence of the "traditional" or
"classic independent."
What is Meant by the Traditional Independent
The implicit assumption apparent in the title of the
traditional independent voter is that this voter is char
acterized by the absence of party loyalty, and that he is
superior because of this independence.

Simply stated, he is

considered a voter of candidates and issues rather than
party.

These ideas led to the conclusion that the indepen

dent assumed the individuality of a highly informed and
rational voter.

Moreover, these adulatory assumptions

promoted the independent's image as the ideal condition for
the success of democracy.

The independent's image is

socially accepted because it conformed to the explicit ideas
of democratic theory.

For example, according to James Bryce,

democratic theory advocated the following behavior for its
citizens:
. . . The average citizen will give close and con
stant attention to public affairs, recognizing that this
is his interest as well as his duty. He will comprehend
the main issues of policy, bringing to them an indepen
dent and impartial mind, which thinks first not of his
own but of the general interest. If, owing to inevitable
differences of opinion as to what are the measures needed
for the general welfare, parties become inevitable, he
will join one, and attend its meetings, but will repress
the impulses of party spirit. Never failing to come to
the polls, he will vote for his party candidates only if
satisfied by his capacity and honesty.
James Bryce, Modern Democracies, 2 vols.
The MacMillan Company, 1921), 1: 48.'

(New York:
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The above description of the traditional independent
as the mainstream of independence lies dominant in the minds
of many laymen even today.

However, beginning with the

independent's appearance in political literature (around
1900), political scientists and researchers provided no clear
picture for the behavior of the independent voter.

This lack

of understanding and confusion was not relieved when George
Gallup's national survey started classifying independents.
On the contrary, it has been noted that this standardized
technxgue has only aggravated the matter.

The aimless or

haphazard commitment by analysts for a precise and truthful
analysis of the independent provoked Samuel Eldersveld in
1952 to express the following opinion:
We assume the existence of a phenomenon in individual
voting behavior which is characterized by the absence of
party loyalty or by the periodic transference of party
allegiances. This is variously labelled "independent
voting," "irregular voting," or some similar term. We
assume further that it is of tremendous importance for
the party process as well as the political system gener
ally. But, so far, the unsustained and unsystematic
nature of research, combined with questionable research
techniques, has left us practically uninformed. Our
objectives presumably are to determine the extent, charac
teristics, relevant factors, and effects of independent
voting. But the theory basic to such research has been
nonexistent or ill-defined, and as a consequence we have
mere fragments of information.0
A few years later, the "bible" of voting behavior, The
American Voter, formulated the foremost description of the
To recall this self-identification process, see p. 3
above.
3
Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Independent. Vote: Measure
ment, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy,"
American Political Science Review 51 (September 1952):735.
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traditional independent from all the havoc about independence
in voting.

4

Most political examiners accepted The American

Voter's exegesis of the independent as an undistorted inter
pretation.

The wrecking crew from the Survey Research Cen

ter of the University of Michigan demolished, in the contents
of The American Voter, the stereotyped profile of the inde
pendent as a discriminating voter.

Their drafted conclu

sions constructed this new definition for the traditional
independent:
The ideal of the Independent citizen, attentive to poli
tics, concerned with the course of government, who weighs
the rival appeals of a campaign and reaches a judgment
that is unswayed by partisan prejudice, has had such a
vigorous history in the tradition of political reform—
and has such a hold on civic education today— that one
could easily suppose that the habitual partisan has the
more limited interest and concern with politics. But if
the usual image of the Independent voter is intended as
more than a normative ideal, it fits poorly the charac
teristics of the Independents in our samples. Far from
being more attentive, interested, and informed, Indepen
dents tend as a group to be somewhat less involved in
politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the
issues, their image of the candidates is fainter, their
interest in the campaign is less, their concern over the
outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between
competing candidates, although it is indeed made later
4
The principal studies of voting behavior besides The
American Voter are: Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and
Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1944); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and
William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1954); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, The
Voter Decides (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1954); Angus
Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, The People Elect a President (Ann
Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1952); Angus Campbell and Homer
C. Cooper, Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes (Ann Arbor:
Survey Research Center, 1956); Eugene Burdick and Arthur J.
Bradbeck, American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, Illinois: The
Free Press, 1959); and Campbell et al., Elections and the
Political Order.
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in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discov- 5
erable evaluations of the elements of national politics.
The independent profile that emerged from The 7\merican
Voter still persists today and is valued as the most reliable
description of the independent by political analysts.

6

James

MacGregor Burns, for example,.patronizes The American Voter
by emphatically remarking that
most independents, it seems, know as much about the
candidates and issues as most adults know about teen
agers' television stars and the range they sing. In both
cases there are few known landmarks to be guided by. The
typical independent drifts from election to election with
out a stable political mooring; he may shift his position
casually during the campaign; he is affected by a tele
vision program he happens to see, an argument he over
hears, a stray piece of gossip, the candidate's face,
his wife's hat, or„the ride to the polls that some party
worker offers him.
Recognizing the Distinctiveness
of the Ticket-Splitter
While the independent profile from The American Voter
was revered by most political literature as the basic descrip
tion of all independent voters, some political analysts had
qualms about the behavior of all independents being depicted
5

Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 143.

^Some scholars today, however, are beginning to argue
that earlier voting studies, especially The American Voter,
are "time-bound." By this they mean theft. the conclusions of
the voting studies more accurately describe the years that
these studies focus on rather than being valid for future time
periods. At the present, most of the "revisionist" literature
is in article form. For example, see Gerald M. Pomper, "From
Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956-1968,"
American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972):415-428.
^James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy:Four
Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren
tice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 210.
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as irrational and uninterested voters.

The classification

of independents made it clear in many instances that ballotsplitters were rational, objective individuals.

However,

this did not necessarily mean that all ballot-splitter
typologies proved that crossover voters were just as wise and
attentive as partisans.
For example, Angus Campbell and Warren Miller's study
on "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket
Voting" aligns itself with the view of the independent
8

expressed by The American Voter.

The authors attempted to

analyze independence in voting (i.e., ballot-splitters) by
indicating what was on the voter's mind during the practice
of crossover voting.

9

Deviations across party lines (split-

ticket voting) were judged according to three "vote-supporting
motives";

(1) party identification,

(2) candidate partisanship,

g

Angus Campbell and Warren Miller, "The Motivational
Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," American Poli
tical Science Review 51 (June 1957):293-312.
9
Basing crossover voting on certain motivational
assumptions, Campbell and Miller were able to classify the
variety of ways a ticket-splitter could vote into the five
following patterns of ballot-splitting:
"1. Those who vote a straight ticket except
for President
2. Those who vote a straight ticket except
for congressman or senator
3. Those who vote a straight ticket at the
national level (president, senator and congress
man) but a straight ticket for the opposite party
at the state and local level
4. Those who vote a straight ticket at the
national level but split their ticket at the
state and local level
5. Those who split their ticket both at the
national and local levels"
Campbell and Miller, The Motivational Basis, p. 294.
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and (3) issue partisanship.
Using these three political variables for their moti
vational analysis, it was found that both the straightticket voters and the split-ticket voters could be placed
into one of the two broad categories.

Either they were the

politically activated voters or those who were indifferent to
political activity.

Voters who axe politically activated are

likely to express an enthusiastic interest in either the
party, the candidates, or the issues.

Some voters will have

a strong conviction or motivation for all three.

Also, these

voters will feel that their vote is important and that they
have an important stake in the outcome of the election.

By

contrast, the indifferent voters, even though they make it
to the polls, are less involved in the political battle.
Nonetheless, Campbell and Miller discovered that
^Tbe three vote-supporting motives that determined
variations in voting for the President in the 1952 election
relate directly to the parties, candidates, and issues.
These political variables (vote-supporting motives) are
defined as the following:
"Party identification. We refer by this term to
the sense of personal attachment which the individual
citizen feels toward the political party of his choice.
We equate strong identification with high significance
of the party as an influential standard. . . .
Candidate partisanship. This variable is defined as
the structuring of political events in terms of a per
sonal attraction to the major personalities involved,
. . . The scoring of the responses . . . divided the
respondents into those who reacted preferentially to the
personal qualities of one candidate or the other and
those who did not.
Issue partisanship. This term refers to concern with
issues of governmental policy and association of one or
the other party or presidential candidate with these
issues in a favorable or unfavorable way."
Campbell and Miller, The Motivational Basis, pp. 302-303.
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occasionally both the politically involved voter and the
indifferent voter would either split their vote or cast a
straight-ticket vote.

The discussion so far can be summa

rized by the classification of four different voters:
(1) the motivational straight-ticket voter, (2) the motiva
tional split-ticket voter,

(3) the indifferent straight-

ticket voter, and (4) the indifferent split-ticket voter.^
As the vote-supporting motives increase for one voter,
the more likely it is he will cast a straight-party ticket
and not a crossover vote.

For example, the motivational

straight-ticket voter is an involved and informed partisan
who votes a straight-ticket because he holds strong views
on the parties, the candidates, and the issues.

Also, con

flict among the vote-supporting motives for the motivated
split-ticket voter causes him to compromise his vote by
splitting his ballot.

The deviants in this motivational

scheme are the indifferent straight and split-ticket voters.
The indifferent straight-ticket voter has little concern or
feels no stake in the election.

His vote ultimately is

guided by the "least effort" which involved a straight-ticket.
Finally, the indifferent split-ticket voter, like the pre
vious voter, has no ambition to be involved politically.

His

split-vote is based, for instance, upon such superficial
reasons as a friend's request or a candidate's nationality.*
212
1
■^Ibid. , p. 312.
12Ibid., pp. 300-307.
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Campbell and Miller's 1956 study goes beyond the sim
ple classification of the independent as a monolithic group
ing of ballot-splitters and accepts a certain amount of
partisan ticket-splitting.

Nevertheless.., their four-fold

classification relegates the independent (i.e.„ ticketsplitter) to an inferior position vis-a-vis with the parti
san.

Agreeing with The American Voter., the independent

becomes a symbol of irrationality and ignorance in regard to
bis voting habits.

in contrast,, the motivated straight and

split-ticket voters are basically party personnel and become
identified as the intelligent and politically aroused voters.
As we will see from other studies.., their isolated research
blinded them to the possibility of an independent function
ing as a participator of high interest and low partisan
ship.
'The separation between the independent and the party
member according to interest and involvement in Campbell and
'Miller 's article is identical to the view expressed in the
Elmira voting study:: '"The classic ''independent voter" of
high .interest but low partisanship is a deviant case.." 13

The

Elmira study"s reasoning is based on the correlation between
interest in the election and participation.

'They believed

that '"almost all measures of political involvement and par
ticipation are highly correlated with one another, and for
.
analytical
purposes., interchangeable..1"14

'Their conclusion1
*
4
3

13Bereison., bazarsfeld,, and BcPhee,, Voting,, p. 27.
14Ibid-.,, p, 24.
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manufactured the hypothesis that "since participation
increases political .interest, anything that weakens partisan
feelings decreases interest."-1^

Consequently, they presumed

that all independents debilitated partisanship.
Finally, The American Voter substantiated the conclu
sions of high involvement by party regulars and low partici
pation by independents (i.e., ticket-splitters).

These

beliefs naturally produced the premise that party identifica
tion is the single most important determinant of voting behav
ior. -*-6 Furthermore, subsequent literature accepted these
ideas and believed that their findings were applicable to
any future election.

However, with the increased tendency

toward ticket-splitting and the infatuation the ticketsplitter has with the candidates and the issues, some poli
tical observers feel that it is questionable as to whether
party identification will maintain its number one spot. 17
Nevertheless, of more importance was the immediate misgivings
about the notion of the independent as one distinct, irra
tional group.

For example, as has been noted, James MacGregor

Burns's writing reaffirmed the traditional independent
espoused by The American Voter; yet, he realized the need for
the categorization of the independent.

One type of indepen

dent who splits his vote, declared Burns, was motivated by
interest and guided by rationality.

This "mugwump" studied*
7
1

^Ibid. , p. 27.
Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 142-143.
17Burnham, Critical Elections, pp. 119-121.
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and voted for the candidates and issues.
Other authors made an even more concentrated and con
vincing case for this mugwump independent.

Such authors

were Samuel J. Eldersveld, Alan S. Meyer, and Robert E.
19
. . .
Agger.
Even though they represented a minority opinion,
these authors realized that a considerable number of inde
pendents were not always uninformed, uninvolved, and irra
tional in their voting decisions.

The explorations by these

authors brought them to the point where they accepted cate
gories for the independent voter.

However, it is apparent

that as the forefather of DeVries and Tarrance's ticketsplitter, this activated ballot-splitter is comprised basi
cally of independents with no significant inclusion for the
Democrats and the Republicans.

At a later date, we will be

able to set aside this assertion because the ticket-splitter,
consisting basically of partisans, will be revealed by DeVries
and Tarrance.

But for now it is important to remember that

from the independent descendant appeared some of the first
tenacles of DeVries and Tarrance's ticket-splitter.
Samuel Eldersveld opened many political eyes when he
conceded that we actually know very little about the1
9
8
18Burns, p. oil
211.
19
Eldersveld, pp. 732-753; Alan S. Meyer, "The Indepen
dent Voter," in Public Opinion and Congressional Elections,
ed. William N. McPhee and William Glaser (New York: Free
Press, 1962), pp. 65-77; and Robert E. Agger, "Independents
and Party Identifiers: Characteristics and Behavior in 1952,"
in American Voting Behavior, ed. Eugene Burdick and Arthur
Bradbeck (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 308329.
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independents and that there has been a proclivity to general
ize about the political behavior of the independent:
The truth is that the strategic significance of the
"independents" has never been carefully studied,
although we are quick to say they may hold "the balance
of power." Further, the factors related to, or causing,
"independence" have generally eluded us. . . .
And, because we have not begun yet the real work in
this area, our high-level generalizations are translated
in many ways. Independents may be many or few; they may
be increasing or not; areal patterns may or may not exist;
independents may be of many undetermined types; they may
be intelligent or fickled; and the effects of independent
voting on the political system may be beneficial or dan
gerous. The state of our knowledge about the independent
voting is obviously not precise, well documented, or
unanimous.
Eldersveld immediately realized that independence in
voting is a complex solution made from different behavior
patterns and attitudes.

His conclusions disavowed a homo

geneous group of independents and he sought a new typology
for independent voting.

Eldersveld isolated types of inde

pendent voters and categorized them as the following:
Split-ticket voters; those who transfer allegiance over
time; voters with no crystallized party predisposition;
those who waver in making a voting decision; and minorparty supporters. 1
In his 1950's study, Eldersveld observed that indepen
dents make up at least one-third of the electorate.

And of

this one-third, at least two-thirds were "accessible" to
partisan appeals.'?2

These activated independents were simi

lar to partisans because they took extreme positions on many*
2
^Eldersveld, p. 735.
2^Ibid. , p. 73 6.
22Ibid., pp. 738-742.
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political issues.

Eldersveld's careful analysis avowed that

these activated independents fell mostly into the above cate
gory of split-ticket voters.

Unlike the other hard core

independents, the split-ticket voter was characterized by a
high level of political participation. 23

P'or instance,

regarding voting turnout, independents as a group have a poor
record of voting.

Generally, their turnout has never been

superior to that of partisans.

But when the split-ticket

category was examined separately from all the other cate
gories of independents, it was discovered that they voted
with astonishing regularity.

As a group, they voted more

consistently than Democrats but a little less than Republi
cans,^ which was later reiterated by DeVries and Tarrance.2
25
4
2
3
Eldersveld's ticket-splitter does participate frequently and
is concerned with the issues.

These characteristics will

also stand out in the ticket-splitter of the 1960's and the
early 1970's.
Alan Meyer convincingly presented the independent as a
2 6

combination of political involvement and nonpartisanship. u
Meyer accepts the idea that these two characteristics cause
a certain amount of friction between themselves.

But this

abrasion does not have to relegate all independents to a low
level of involvement because of their inconstancy of party
23Ibid., pp. 746-750.
24Ibid., p. 747.
25
DeVries and Tarrance, p. 61.
o r

"'Meyer, pp. 66-71.
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allegiance-

In effect, this means that the independent can

stress irregularity in his commitment and still vote for the
parties.

Moreover, this flexibility for parties will not

stifle his impulse for political action: "The independent
voter, then, is a deviant in the electorate, for he violates
the rule that partisanship goes with involvement, nonpartisanship with apathy." 27
The long used definition of the independent voter
becomes revamped when the independent voter, along with all
other voters, is judged according to his flexibility and
interest in participation.
produced four voter types:

Using this test, Meyer's findings
(1) "independent voter," a highly

involved voter with a low party commitment;

(2) "partisan

voter," this voter is the party member who is politically
involved;

(3) "apathetic voter," the indifferent voter who

is not committed to a party and does not actively partici
pate in politics; and (4) "habitual voter," also an indif
ferent voter who is a party member but one who shies away
from political involvement."0
The independent that is described in the above typology
breaks the mold formed by advocates of the irrational and
uninvolved independent.

Meyer's independent resembles the

partisan because he turns out to vote, reads and analyzes the
different media, discusses the issues, and knows the candi
date's policy position.
27

Ibid., P- 71.
28 .
Ibid., P* 72.

We are able to see that this
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independent's political awareness and '"considered choices"
silhouettes the contemporary ticket-splitter's profile.
Because this stimulated independent evaluates the merits of
both parties, he is likely to split his vote between the
parties.

The independent as a true ballot-splitter will

again be reaffirmed in the future ticket-splitter.
The turning over of the independent rock to see the
hidden ticket-splitter is continued in Robert Agger's inquiry.
Kis link in the independent chain strengthens the idea that
the ticket-splitter was shadowed by an alert and informed
voter.

Agger simply addresses himself to the question: "Do

independents differ significantly from party identifiers in
their political behavior?"

The answer to the question was

based according to the political participation of independents
29
and party identifiers.
Political participation was concocted as a mixture of
both overt and psychological behavior features.

Overt par

ticipation includes such political activities as: voting,
making a monetary contribution, attending a political rally
or meeting, campaigning for a candidate or party, and attempt
ing to persuade another to vote a certain way.

Psychological

participation is based upon attitudes on issues, candidates,
and towards citizen duty.

Also, psychological participation

is evaluated by the voter's perception of primary group voting
29Agger, p . 309.
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behavior and his political interest in and the outcome of
.
30
the campaign,'
In 1952* the independents as a group showed no overt
participation differences from party members.

The data in

the study indicated that independents were not only similar
to partisans on all overt activities but also that they were
31
.
. .
even somewhat higher than Democrats.
This is surprising
because it was assumed that independents would be less active
than party regulars on some overt activities.

Agger’s probe

o

buttressed the inference made by Campbell* Gurin* and Miller
in their 1952 voting study: *'We could not have made a very
much better prediction of whether a person would vote or
otherwise support his candidates from knowing which party
category he put himself in than if we knew nothing about his
party identification.'"
Although there is a relation between '"caring"' (psycho
logical participation) and "'doing1' (overt participation) * it
was hypothesized that psychological participation for the
independent would not be as high as overt participation.
evidence* however* proved the contrary.

The

Political participa

tion at the psychological level* like the overt level* demon
strated that independents as a group and party identifiers
3DIhid., pp. 318-327.
31 Ibid.* pp. 319-32 0.
32
Campbell* Gurin* and Miller* The Voter Decides*
p. 108* quoted in Agger* p. 319.
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were similar.
Even if independents as a group reacted in the same
manner or fashion as partisans, this did not mean that there
was absolute uniformity within the independent coalition.
Agger was able to separate the independent voters into the
following categories:

(1) poorly educated independents who

are not concerned with issues but are aware of the candidates
(candidate-oriented independent); (2) independents who care
about the issues and participate as frequently as a poorly
educated party member (issue-oriented independent); and
(3) highly educated independents who are intrigued with both
issues and candidates.'34

Members of the first two groups

are not as involved, and thus do not participate as often as
those in the third group.

But among highly educated indepen

dents (third category), we see some of the features that will
be used to describe the ticket-splitter.

The resemblance is

seen through the rationality, involvement, and awareness of
the candidates and the issues by the two voters.
Departing from the last three studies, we will concen
trate on Dr. H. Daudt's methodical and warranted research
that focuses on voters who change their minds at successive
electrons. 35 These "floating voters" (i.e., independents)
J^Agger, pp. 321-327.
J^Ibid., p. 328.
35

D r . H . Daudt, Floating Voters and the Floating Vote:
A Critical Ana lysis of American and English Election Studies
(Leiden, Holland: H.E. Stenfert, Kroese N.V., 1961).
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are not identical to the ticket-splitter but they do exhibit
some ticket-splitting traits.

Conforming with studies that

unearthed admirable qualities in some independents, Daudt's
expose continues to challenge the "pertinacity of the myth
of the dumbness of the floating voters."^0
His first subjective move was to establish possibili
ties of changes by the floating voter.

The changes in two

successive elections are:
1. Party Changers, those who vote for party A at
one election and for party B at the next or vice versa
2. Crystallizers f those who abstain at one elec
tion and vote for one or the other of the parties at
the next
3. Disintegrators , those who have voted for one
of the parties at one_election, but abstain from voting
on the next occasion^ 1
The above descriptions of floating voters are insuf
ficient if you do not include the possible directions of
the changes.
sions:

The voter will have four possible voting deci

(1) non-voting,

(2) vote for the Democrats,

(3) vote

for the Republicans, and (4) vote for one of the minor
38
parties
In effect, we have focused on the possibilities
■^Ibid. , p. 168.
■^Ibid. , p. 12.
3 8
Using these four possibilities, Daudt stated that
there are twelve conceivable voting directions in the United
States for changers:
"1. From non-voting to the Republicans
2. From non-voting to the Democrats
3. From non-voting to a minor party
4. From the Republicans to non-voting
5. From the Republicans to the Democrats
6. From the Republicans to a minor party
7. From the Democrats to non-voting
8. From the Democrats to the Republicans

38
of changes (general nature) and then proceeded to indicate
the possible voting directions of the changes.
Subsequent analysis of the above changers by Daudt
disapproves three premises established by earlier voting
studies.

His findings are, first of all, that there are no

grounds for believing that any particular social grouping is
responsible for the floating voter.
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Second, cross-pressures

4 0
affect all voters and not just floating voters. '
Third,, and
for our research the most important, the opinion that floaters
41
are less intelligent is unfounded.
The verdict of the third conclusion is a reformulation
of the schematic pattern devised by Morris Janowitz and
42
.
Dwaine Marvick.
In the Janowitz and Marvick study, politi
cal "self-confidence" and "self-interest in elections" were
the two concepts used to determine four types of citizens:
(1) effective citizens,

(2) indifferent citizens,

(3) involved

9. From the Democrats to a minor party
10. From a minor party to non-voting
11. From a miner
party to the Republicans
12. From a minor
party to the Democrats"
Daudt, p. 12. DeVries and Tarrance expand on the above
scheme of voting options by including the ticket-splitter
and those who continue to vote or not to vote the same way
as they did in the last election (see Appendix D ) .
39
Daudt, pp. 78-79.
40
Ibid.,, p. 122.
^Ibid., p. 168.
42
'Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive
Pressure and Democratic Consent: An Interpretation of the
1952 Presidential Election (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Govern
ment, Institute of Public Administration, University of
Michigan, 1956), pp. 30-34, cited by Daudt, pp. 143-148.
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spectators, and (4) apathetic persons.^

The indifferent

citizen (do not be deceived by the negative connotation
implied by his name) in Janowitz and Marvick's citizen cate
gorization, is endowed with high self-confidence and weak
self-interest which fits the dimensions prescribed by classic
democratic theory.

This model citizen pays close attention

to the political process, tries to comprehend issues, judges
candidates with an impartial mind, and does not think of the
election outcome in terms of his own interest.

If floating

voters are considered involved voters of the highest order
guided by a discerning light, they should be found in this
category more than any other voter according to democratic
theory.
Conversely, we know from election surveying studies*
4
3
2
43To measure or gauge "self-interest in elections"
the criteria used were whether the respondent considered
the victory of one party more important than the other party
and if he thought the democratic process was important regard
less of who won. To gauge "political self-confidence" the
respondent was judged according to (1) his belief that the
election process made it possible for him to influence
political decisions, (2) his capability to understand the
issues in the election, and (3) if he believed that his par
ticipation in the election really made a difference. After
the respondents answered a number of questions dealing with
the above matters they were divided into persons with strong
or weak self-interest and high or low political selfconfidence :
"1* Effective citizens were defined as persons
with high self-confidence and strong self-interest
2. Indifferent citizens as persons with high
self-confidence and weak self-interest
3. Involved spectators as those with low selfconfidence and strong self-interest
4. Apathetic persons as those with low selfconfidence and weak self-interest"
Daudt, pp. 143-144.
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that changers should be found in the apathetic grouping
because the crossover voter has been considered the most
ignorant and whimsical member of the electorate:
The notion that the people who switch parties
the campaign are mainly the reasoned, thoughtful,
scientious people who are convinced by the issues
election is just plain wrong. Actually they were
just the opposite. ^

during
con
of the
mainly

And, The American Voter concluded that
the broadest movements of party strength between elec
tions, usually cutting across a great many social groups,
are fed disproportionately by shifts among the less
involved and poorly informed members of the electorate.
After Daudt ransacked the same material investigated by
Janowitz and Marvick, he found that ''ho one of the four types
of citizens alone has been responsible for the floating
voters."^

This moderate view does not accept the hard line

conception of all voters being a model or ideal citizen, or
the opposite view that switchers are the least intelligent
voters.

This revelation sustains attempts by researchers

who indicated an intelligent distinguisher inherent in the
activated independent.

In the future, the inheritance of

this rationality will be accounted for in the assets of the
modern psephos.
The best defense is considered to be the most aggres
sive offense.

The revered V. 0. Key* Jr., used this tactic

in his game plan by articulating a political philosophy that*
4
44
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, The People's
Choice, p. 69.
45
Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 547.
46
Daudt, pp. 145-146.
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voters are not numbskulls.

In the introduction to The

Responsible Electorate, he states:
The preverse and unorthodox argument of this little
book is that voters are not fools. To be sure, many
individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet in the
large the electorate behaves about as rationally and
responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of
the alternatives presented to it and the character of
the information available to it. '
To prove the validity of this argument, Key observed
the political movements of groups of voters.

These voter

groupings were formulated by Key according to the following
typology:

(1) "standpatters," those who stand pat on their

decision to vote for the same party from election to election,
(2) "switchers," they are the voters who move across party
lines, and (3) "new voters," these voters did not vote in
the preceding election because they were either too young or
48
because of some other preventive reason.
From this typology, Key reconsidered what had been
said about straight-ticket voters '(standpatters) and indepen
dents (switchers) in past electoral studies.

Key's opinion

was that "millions of voters switch party preferences" (i.e.,
split their ticket from election to election) and that aggre
gate data presented a spurious picture of only a few shifting
voters because of the relatively slight difference in party
percentages from successive elections.

Furthermore, Key's

contrasting of the standpatters and switchers promotes the
V .0. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality
in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7.
48
Ibid., p . 16.
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idea of rationality because he discovered that they were both
knowledgeable on the issues and committed to political skir. .
49
mishes.
The Survey Research Center admitted that the trend in
the 1968 election added validity to Key's contention, which
indicated that "the mass electorate is a good deal less
irrational, ill-informed or sheep-like than it had become
fashionable to suppose."

And to this they added, "to our

point of view, Key's general thesis represented a welcome
corrective on some earlier emphases."

50

In 1968, the Survey

Research Center substantiated Key's "responsible electorate"
by using the Wallace movement as the testing vehicle.

Based

on Key's definitions for voters, no one backing Wallace could
have been a standpatter; rather, they would had to have been
switchers.

Consequently, Wallace's candidacy proved that

Key's premises of issue factor and candidate factor were
variables that voters discriminated between and voted on. 51
All the previous research that scrutinized the changeover voter and the degree of rationality inherent in that
voter culminated with the innovative, detailed account of the
ticket-splitter by Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance.

The

fortunes of the ticket-splitter were discovered because these
^Ibid. , pp. 9-28.
50
Philip E. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in
American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election,"
American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969):1095.
51
Ibid., pp. 1096-1097.

43
authors felt that there was a need for a new definition of
independence.
As has already been stated, the chains of logic for the
independent voter border on the good, bad, and indifferent.
But, for purposes of clarification, it is likely that there
are at least two broad different independents: the "old inde
pendent" (unattentive, irrational independent) who answers to
the rather desolate survey-research image; and the "new
independent" who fits the description of a voter we like to
see participating in elections, an activated, rational contestant of equal proportion to partisan voters.
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In spite of this activated independent, genuine inde
pendence in voting could not be obtained just through the
independent voter because the impact from the independents
as a group smothers the true identity of the ticket-splitter.
Though the ticket-splitter was often confused with the inde
pendents, no matter what his basic loyalties were (Democratic,
Republican, or independent), he represented actual, undeviat
ing independence by splitting his vote between two major par
ties.

DeVries and Tarrance acknowledged, that the ticket-

splitter could be revealed by the practical test of judging
not what voters say but what they do:
By using only the self-administered and hence selfperceived definition of "Do you consider yourself a Repub
lican, Democrat, or independent?", political scientists
57

"DeVrxes and Tarrance, pp. 48-49.
53
Burnham, Critical. Elections, p. 13 0.
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and public pollsters have offered only a partial
•explanation of independence in voting. The disparity
between the perceptual approach and the behavioral
.approach has inevitably created misunderstandings about
contemporary voting behavior.J
Furthermore, their methodology supplies us with the
astonishing disclosure that many Republicans and Democrats
split their vote regularly.

Also stupefying is that many
55
so-called independents are actually disguised partisans.
Consequently, these findings offer credence to the belief
that ticket-splitters are not totally reliant upon the inde
pendent voter for its membership.

In common sense terms,

the ticket-splitter is seasoned with a dash of independent
voters and a smack of partisan identifiers.

Digressing some

what, it is interesting to note that the self-identified
independent, who consistently votes as a partisan, is prob
ably calling himself an independent because it appears to be
56
socially more acceptable and prestigeous to do so.
The ticket-splitter elevated by DeVries and Terrance is
not a "one issue person'" nor is this voter one "'who could
be easily reached by highly emotional appeals."'

Rather, he

is a "'complex voter"' clothed by Key"s basic theme of the
57
rationality of voters.
The ticket-splitter has a workable
knowledge of the issues and he can identify the policy prefer
ences of the candidates.
5

His main political information is

a

DeVries and Tarrance, p. 54.

55Ibid., pp. 49-54.
^ld.ersveId, p . 737.
57
DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 73-9®.
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basically acquired through the media.

The media greatly

influences the ticket-splitter's personality, especially
through television newscasts, documentaries, specials, edi
torials, and talk shows, newspaper stories and editorials,
and radio newscasts.

And in this "most important influence

factor category", there is nothing that can be directly
affected by the candidate.

Actually, the only direct influ

ence a candidate has on a voter in this area is through his
58
personal contact with the public.
Consequently, the ticketsplitter divides his ballot between candidates because to him
affiliation with all candidates of one party and complete
support of the candidate's issue preferences are not considered
a rational decision on his part.
Finally, DeVries and Tarrance proposed an unorthodox
shift in priorities in regard to how people make up their
minds for a candidate.

Their assertion is that when it comes

to the ticket-splitter's actual behavior, party identification
plays a relatively unimportant role compared to its past sig
nificant influence.

The real stimulation and motivation for

the crossover voter comes from the candidate's personality,
the issues relevant to the campaign, and the candidate's ability to handle these issues. 59
A recapitulation of this chapter is needed to point out
three basic conclusions relevant to the understanding of the
ticket-splitter.

These ideas must be stressed so we will be

5^Ibid., pp. 75-85.
59Ibid., p. 74.
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able to understand our participatory role as a voter in
American politics.

First, there is no homogeneous grouping

of independents acting in a harmonious fashion (i.e., inde
pendents strictly as ballot-splitters) .

Second,, behavioral

ticket-splitters that move across party lines are a conglom
eration of Democrats, Republicans, and independents.

However,

this new wall of voters is predominantly comprised of party
members.

The third and final premise, '"voters are not fools."

This does not mean, as Key himself recognized., that there is
a blanket covering of all voters with complete rationality
in the strictest sense of the word.

To be a rational voter,

one does not have to possess a thorough grasp of all detailed
political information; however, rational voting does demand
a glob£il understanding of the candidates and the issues.
Moreover, .most voters have this global comprehension.

Further

more, voters should be expected to be as rational as they are
allowed by the political information presented to them.
In .summary, thus far we have introduced the ticketsplitter and described the confused relationship existing
between the independent and the ticket-splitter.

We also

have shown the increasing tendency toward ballot-splitting.
Furthermore, we have traced the nebulous heritage of the
ticket-splitter and culminated with a .definition of the cross
over voter defined according to DeVries and Tarranceh dieturns
Now, in Chapter III, we will determine if the North Dakota
ticket-splitter fits the dimensions of DeVries and Tarrance’s
ticket-splitter, and if this ticket-splitter"s socio-economic

47
characteristics are able to distinguish himself as a con
temporary psephos.

CHAPTER III
,A TEST QF .INDEPENDENCE:: THE ."NORTH
DAKOTA TICKET-.SFLITTER
In this .chapter,, .we will .describe ana try to under
stand a group of 'voters who split their ballot:; more speci
fically,., to realize the discrepancy between self-perception
and actual behavior and to observe the socio-economic char
acteristics inherent to the ticket—splitter..

The major focus

of this chapter will be .on the voters of north Dakota.

The

strength and extent of split—ticket voting in North Dakota
will be especially relevant because of the accepted asser
tion that north Dakota is basically a one-party (Republican)
state..

Furthermore, the findings in 'North Dakota, compared

with a national ticket—.splitter".s profile,, will establish the
fact that ticket— splitting is an ubiquitous force and that it
consists of voters with specific socio-economic dimensions.
However,, before we examine the results from the 1974 North
Dakota pre-election survey, it would be .advantageous to review
the political setting in North Dakota..

The analyzation of

partisan patterns in this state will .help determine whether
there are certain conditions conducive for the practice of
ballot-splitting,, even in .a one-party stale,.
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Partisan Patterns in North Dakota
This section will not present a detailed historical
account of all political activities and movements in North
Dakota.

Rather, it will describe the general flow or, at a

particular time, the realignment of voters with a specific
party.

As has been mentioned, North Dakota has been, his

torically, a one-party state.

Generally, most analyses of

North Dakota's partisan politics accept the view that the
1
state is predominantly Republican.
V. 0. Key suggested that
the best way to discover or test the strength of a party
organization in a state is by analyzing and observing the
2
election outcomes of state legislative races.
Following
Key's advice, the construction of Table 5 presents North
Dakota as exhibiting a strong record of Republicanism.

Osten

sibly, the political tradition of North Dakota can easily be
defined according to such words as one-partyism, noncompetitivism, and Republicanism.

And, because of the clear-

cut Republican hegemony noticeable in Table 5, one would
assume that voters from North Dakota are Republican identi
fiers.

Furthermore, the partisan posture of one-partyism

surely appears to approve the belief that voters from North
Dakota are voting, quite consistently, a straight-party ticket.*
2
■*To substantiate this viewpoint, see Paul T. David,
Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970 (Charlottes
ville: University Press of Virginia, 1972); and Louis H. Bean,
How America Votes in Presidential Elections (New Jersey: The
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968).
2

V .0. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduc
tion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 169-196 .
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TABLE 5
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTION OUTCOMES IN STATE
SENATE AND HOUSE RACES IN NORTH DAKOTA: 1900-1974*

Year

Democrats
%
«

1900
1902
1904
1906
1908

0
7
5
7
7

1910
1912
1914
1916
1918

4 8.2
6 12.2
0 0.0

1920
1922
1924
1926
1928

0.0%
17.5
12.5
17.5
14.9

0

0

0.0
0.0

0

0,0

0
0
0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0

Senate

Republicans
%
*
80.6%
25
75.0
30
34
85.0
82.5
33
39
83.0

Democrats
%
t
5 8.1%
12 12.0
1 1.0
12 12.0
7 7.4

44
44
49
49
49

12 11.7
8 7.2

House

Republicans
%
«
57
86
99
87
87

91.9%
86.0
99.0
87.0
91.6
87.4
92.8
100.0
100.0
100.0

0
0

0.0
0.0
0.0

90
103
112
112
113

49 100.0
49 , 100.0
49 100.0
49 100.0
49 100.0

0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

113
113
113
113
113

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

89.8
88.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

0
0
0
0
0

19 30
1932
1934
19 36
1938

0
0
0
0
0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

49
49
49
49
49

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

0
0
0
0

2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.8

113
113
113
113
111

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
98.2

1940
1942
1944
1946
194 8

0

0.0

8.2
6.1
6.1
4.1

49
45
46
46
47

100.0
91.8
93.9
93.9
95.9

7
4
2
2

0

0.0

6.2
3.5
1.8
1.8

113
106
109
111
111

100.0
93.8
96.5
98.2
98.2

1950
1952
1954
1956
1958

2 4.1
2 4.1
3 4.1
9 18.4
15 30.6

47
47
46
40
34

95.9
95.9
93.9
81.6
69.4

2 1.8
1
.9
2 1.8
19 16.8
48 42.5

111
112
113
94
65

98.2
99.1
98.2
83.2
57.5

1960
1962
1964
1966
1968

21
12
20
6
6

42.9
24.5
40.8
12.2
12.2

28
37
29
43
43

57.1
75.5
59.2
87.8
87.8

40
43
65
15
18

35.4
38.1
59.6
15.3
18.4

73
70
44
83
80

69.6
61.9
40.4
84.7
81.6

1970
1972
1974

11
10
17

22.4
20.0
33.3

38
41
34

77.6
80.0
66.6

38 38.8
2 3 22.5
40 39.2

60
79
62

61.2
77.5
60.8

4
3
3
2

*The data fo r 1900 to 1972 were compiled from the No rth Dakota L e g isl a tiv e
Blue Book (1973), published by le g is la tiv e a u th o rity under the d ire c tio n o f Ben
M e ie rj S ecretary o f S ta te . The fig u re s fo r 1974 were obtained from the
B io g ra p h ic a l Sketches of the 1975 L e g is la tu re , published by the Bureau o f Govern
m ental A ffa ir s a t the U n iv e rs ity o f North Dakota.
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However, there are a number of mitigating aspects
which shape the partisan politics of North Dakota into a
more understandable, realistic political arena.

First of

all, North Dakota has had long-standing political battles
based upon economic lines.

About the first five decades of

the 1900's, economic cleavages in North Dakota became mani
fested in the political activities of the Non-Partisan
3

League (NPL).

Since its inception in 1916, the NPL never

operated outside the confines of the two major parties.
From its beginnings and during most of its history, the NPL
decided to file its nominated candidates in the Republican
column.

However, in 1956 the NPL shifted a preponderance of
4
its power and membership to the ranks of the Democrats, and
there it became absorbed until it is now no longer recogniz

able as a separate political movement.
Nevertheless, the NPL during its functioning years was,
at times, a powerful influencer of political events and deci
sions in North Dakota.

Furthermore, even though the NPL

quite regularly supported the national Republican candidates
over Democratic nominees, it still disputed vociferously with
the state Republican party over economic policy matters.

The3
4

3
For the details of the early years of the NPL, see
Andrew Bruce, Non-Partisan League (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1921); and for a more thorough account of the NPL
see Robert Morlan, Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan
League, 1915-1922 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1955).
4
For the full story of the NPL'ts x-ealignment, see Lloyd
B. Orndahl, Insurgents (Brainerd, Minnesota: Lakeland Color
Press, 1961).
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upshot of all the economic stress experienced by farmers,
evident by the NPL organization, caused an intra-party
struggle in the Republican party.

This rivalry undoubtedly

led to an unending battle for control of the state government
between the two factions.

The traditional economic divisions

illustrated a sharp independence in voters from a state that
has been considered basically a den of one-partyism.

This

independent spirit would make it easy for many North Dakotans
to shift their allegiance to a viable second force combating
Republicanism.
Secondly, Republican primary battles were indicating--while the NPL was filing in the GOP column— -a greater diver
sity of voting habits than what was demonstrated by the numer
ical strength and the election outcomes for the Republican
party in North Dakota.

V. 0. Key discovered similar primary

competition when he studied the Democratic-dominated southern
states.

Key stated that there was a high level of tension

within the primary of the dominant party:
One partyism, as measured by formal attachment to a
single party, is by no means a satisfactory indicator
of political homogeneity for within southern one-party
states from time to time deep and abiding cleavages
make themselves manifest in the primary vote.5
Many times the primary fight would not resolve the can
didate preference between the Leaguers and the Republican
regulars.

Dissatisfied with the primary winner, one of

these two factions would enter their own candidate in the
5
V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, p. 228.
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general election.
taken.

Sometimes even more drastic measures were

For example, in 1938 the NPL won the Republican pri

mary nomination for governor.

Meanwhile, the conservative

wing of the Republican party became disgruntled with the pri
mary outcome and voted for Democrat John Moses for governor
in the general election.

In addition, Moses's victory pro

duced reliable evidence of split-ticket voting.

In the pri

mary election, the total Republican vote vas 173,000; and in
g

the general election, the NPL-Republican vote fell to 101,000.
The conflicting political "tugs of war" in North Dakota
distinguished a number of political groupings.

Lloyd E.

Omdahl, an observer and participator in North Dakota's poli
tics, reported that in the 12 years preceding 1956, five
"identifiable circles" (the Democrats, Democratic interlopers,
Insurgents, Old Guarders, and the Republican Organizing
Committee) were evident in North Dakota's political scene of
7
action.
Moreover, the political clashes in North Dakota
provoked V. O. Key in 1956 to boldly announce that, "in a
sense, North Dakota has had a three-party system: the NPL,
g
the ROC [Republican Organizing Committee], and the Democrats."1'
Third, political bickering and divisions culminated
with "the most significant political event in North Dakota
in 1956 . . . the movement of the Non Partisan League from*
8
7
^Ib.id., p . 252 .
7
Omdahl, pp. 199-203.
8

V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, p. 253.
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the Republican to the Democratic column."

9

Reusing Key's

suggestion for determining the strength of a state party
organization through the observance of state legislative
races we find, when reviewing Table 5, a notable change in
the percentage of Democrats being elected to both the Senate
and the House starting with and following the 1956 election
in North Dakota.

The changing Democratic trend can also be

seen more readily by focusing on specific counties.

For

example, 1956 local election results in Grand Forks County
showed that "this was the first time since at least the
close of World War II that there were candidates for state
legislative offices from Grand Forks County in the Democratic
column."^

Surprisingly, while President Eisenhower received

62 percent of the county's votes, the mean average percentages
for Republicans and Democrats in state legislative races were
59 percent and 41 percent."*""1

Statewide, it is probably accu

rate to say that the NPL's realignment added to the Democratic ranks as many as 40,000 votes.

12

Ross B. Talbot stated that the most effective way of
testing the "new coalition" is by measuring the increased
amount of straight-ticket voting for that coalition.

In other

words, in North Dakota there has been a trend in which state
9
Ross B. Talbot, "North Dakota— A Two-Party State?"
The North Dakota Quarterly 25 (Fall 1957):93.
1 0 Ibid., p. 99.

11
Ibid.
12

Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North Dakota (Nebraska
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 472.
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Republican candidates ran substantially ahead of those
Republican candidates running for President and Vicepresident.

Conversely, state Democratic candidates ran

considerably behind the Democratic candidates for President
and Vice-president.

13

Table 6 shows that m

1956 there was

a reversal of the above trends when the NPL shifted to the
Democratic organization.

The new voting habits, induced by

the reversal of trends, drew the two parties marginally
closer with Republican majorities not being so overwhelming.
The NPL's continual threat of shifting to the Democratic
column and its final realignment with the party became mani
fested in the fluctuating Republican margins in the presi
dential contests.

In 1948, Dewey garnered 52 percent of the

vote in North Dakota; in 1958, Eisenhower received 71 percent
and, in 1956 he totaled 62 percent; in 1960, Nixon tallied 55
^ 14
percent.
These vacillating presidential statistics, combined
with Democratic increases in state legislative races, pre
sented refreshing news to advocates of two-partyism.

One

political analyst went so far as to declare that "for the
first time in its history, North Dakota was actually becoming
a two-party state."

1c

Fourth, there are certain political conditions which
lJTalbot, p. 98.
14
Robinson, p. 473.
15
Ibid.
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TABLE 6
VOTE FOR GOVERNOR COMPARED (Plus or Minus)
WITH VOTE FOR PRESIDENT
1948
Rep.

1952
Demo.

Rep.

1956
Demo.

Rep.

Demo.

County
(Rural)
Billings*
*
Cavalier
Dunn
Sargent
Slope
Stark

+
+
+
+
+
+

101

500
183
403
88

434

-

108
653
197
431
81
397

+

6

906
+ 10
+ 136
+ 40
+ 303

+
-

+ 332
+ 1529
+ 1215
240
+ 531
+ 452

- 676
-3448
-2345
- 313
-1616
- 905

-

28
718
149
373
67
324

- 34
- 136
- 110
- 71
- 28
- 10

+
+
+
+
+
+

40
72
96
27
30
39

-

+
+
+
+
+
+

555
552
385
490
371
195

County
(Urban)
Burleigh
Cass
Grand Forks
Stark
Ward
Williams

+ 934
+ 2675
+ 1916
+ 328
+ 147
+ 550

- 837
-3237
-2017
- 542
+ 416
- 78

561
774
976
480
530
289

SOURCE: Ross B. Talbot, "North Dakota— A Two-Party State?"
The North Dakota Quarterly 25 (Fall 1957), p. 97.
NOTE: The six rural counties were selected because none
had any urban population (2,500 or over), and more than 60
percent of their population was rural (1950). Six urban coun
ties were those that contained the highest percentage of urban
population (1950).
*For example, in Billings County Aandahl received 101 more
votes than Dewey in 1948, and Henry received 103 less than
Truman; in 1952 Brunsdale polled 6 more votes than Eisenhower
while Johnson polled 23 less than Stevenson; in 1956 Davis
got 34 fewer votes than Eisenhower, but Warner gained 40 votes
more than did Stevenson.
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discriminate against the emergence of Democratic victories.
For instance, Republican hegemony in North Dakota has been
16
maintained by the "ingrained habit" of Republican voting.
Furthermore, it has been verifiably shown that in a close
gubernatorial election, with the Republican candidate winning
the governorship, the Republicans will have the good fortune
17
of more likely carrying all the minor offices.
Moreover,
when a state is normally Republican like North Dakota, even
if a Democrat wins the governorship, the state's minor
offices will probably fall into the hands of the Republican
. 18
party.
However, against all these insurmountable "electoral
discriminators" the Democrats were and still are able to win
elections by crusading behind colorful, political personali
ties.

The Democrats broke the Republican strangle-hold in

1958 when they elected Quentin Burdick to the U.S. House of
Representatives.

In 1960, Burdick won a U.S. Senate seat in

a special election; the Senate seat had been vacated by the
death of William Langer, long-time NPL member.

In the fall

of 1960, Democrat William Guy won the governorship.

Guy had

polled more votes (136,000) than any other Democratic candi
date in the governor's race since Democrat John Moses's 1940
19
gubernatorial total (173,000).
In all, Guy had won two
1 6 Talbot, p. 96.

17
V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics, pp. 202-203.
18
Ibid., p. 205.
19
Robinson, p. 474.
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two-year terms and two four-year terms to retain the
governorship from 1960 to 1972.

Subsequently, the Democratic

personality of Arthur Link was able to overcome Republican
forces in 1972 to keep the governorship in Democratic hands.
From these examples, it is apparent that Democratic person
alities were acquainting the voters of North Dakota with the
notion that Democratic candidates were a responsible alter
native to Republican nominees.
Finally, the fifth aspect concentrates on the selfperceived numerical strength of the Democrats, Republicans
and independents.

From the self-classification process of

political identification for North Dakotans emerges an impor
tant political factor and its significance for future elec
tions.

North Dakota undoubtedly has normally been perceived

as a Republican state.

The majority of Republican victories

in national, state, and local contests has confirmed this
view.

Nevertheless, when North Dakotans were surveyed in the

fall of 1974, 32.5 percent identified themselves as Republi
cans, 34.9 percent as Democrats, and 32.6 percent considered
themselves independents.

This is indeed an amazing surprise

since one would have probably hypothesized that the number of
Republican identifiers would surely be greater than 32.5
percent.

Furthermore, it is fascinating to note that in

Republican North Dakota the percentage of Democratic identifiers
20

These figures were obtained from the 1974 North Dakota
Pre-Election Survey conducted by the Bureau of Governmental
Affairs at the University of North Dakota.
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(34.9%) is slightly larger than the percentage of Repub
lican identifiers (32.5%).
An April 1974 survey conducted by the Peter D. Hart
Research Associates basically substantiates the fall survey
findings."?1

Hart's results show the percentage of Democratic

identifiers (27.0%) greater than the percentage of Republican
identifiers (22.0%).

In Hart's poll, the strength of the two

parties is less than in the North Dakota poll because in
Hart's survey the independents, who had Democratic or Republican leanings, were tallied in the independent category.

22

Examining Hart's categorization of voters, we notice a large
number of voters in the independent grouping (51.0%).

In

the North Dakota poll, we discovered that 32.6 percent of the
voters identified as independents.

The significant and con

sequential observation to conclude from these statistics is
that the Democrats and the Republicans in North Dakota must
appeal to the ranks of the independents to obtain their polit
ical victories.

In other words, they must appeal to the voters

who actually are willing to cross party lines.

These scale

tipping independents (i.e., ticket-splitters) in North Dakota
may be accounted for because of a traditional spirit of
21

This survey was administered by the Peter D. Hart
Research Associates, Inc., April 1974 and was titled, "A Sur
vey of the Political Climate in North Dakota."
22

If the independents, with Democratic or Republican
leanings, were removed from the independent category and added
to the appropriate political party, the Democrats would amass
43 percent of the identifiers and the Republicans would total
34 percent.
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independence.

This spirit has been manifested in agrarian,

third party movements or, through the NPL it has functioned
within the parties and this independence continues to be
disassociated (apparent by the large number of independent
identifiers) with either of the two parties.
Closely related to the idea of traditional independence
has been a traditional conservatism.

The political identifi

cation of voters in North Dakota could be more accurately
described along conservative and liberal lines.

Republicans

in the state are probably winning elections because most
voters, especially the independents, are voting a conservative
viewpoint.

In the future, will this conservatism remain the

overwhelming political philosophy?
The gradual relaxing of conservatism may be evident In
the speculative assumption that the large number of indepen
dents in North Dakota are in a transitional stage.

An example

of this phenomenon is seen in the Democratic southern states.
In the South, there has been a movement by Democrats to the
independent ranks enroute to the Republicans.

The reason for

this shifting is that many southern voters are beginning to
realize that their conservative viewpoints are more in agree
ment with Republicans than Democrats.

However, their long

standing identification with the Democratic party makes it
difficult for them to shift directly and immediately to the
Republican ticket.

Instead, southern Democratic voters are
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gradually shifting to the Republican column by settling
first in the independent transient stage.

23

Conversely, a similar experience may be occurring in
North Dakota.

North Dakota's transient voters may be shift

ing to the ranks of the independents before completely iden
tifying themselves as Democrats.

The immediate realignment

of the NPLers in 1956 might have been the stimulus for long
term withdrawals from the Republican ranks.

Simultaneously,

this transition of voters may be representing a basic philo
sophical realignment or adjustment.

A gradual, liberal men

tality, or at the very least a relaxed conservatism, may be
flourishing within North Dakota as the state appears to be
less agriculturally dominated and more urbanly influenced. 24
The Phenomenon of Ticket-Splitting
in North Dakota
DeVries and Tarrance argued that, nationwide, there are
a growing number of voters who quite regularly split their
25
ballot between candidates of different parties.
This
section will specifically determine the credibility of the
23

Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "The Concept
of Party Image and Its Importance for the Southern Elector
ate," in The Electoral Process, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L.
Harmon Ziegler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1966), pp. 139-173.
24
By 1956, the farmers in North Dakota already totaled
less than one-third of the state's population. In view of
this statistic, it would be erroneous to describe the politi
cal strength of North Dakota in terms of a "farm state."
Talbot, p. 102.
25

DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 28-34.
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phenomenon of ticket-splitting in North Dakota.

Not only

will the degree or extent of ticket-splitting be established,
but we will also surmise who has been crossing over party
lines in North Dakota.
The data used to infer the viability and identity of
the ticket-splitter was obtained through three surveys.

Each

survey had a different sample and all three were conducted by
the Bureau of Governmental Affairs at the University of North
Dakota.

These surveys were mail questionnaires administered

separately and periodically in a time period starting two
months before, and within two weeks of, the 1974 general
election (see Appendix E for questionnaire).

For the pur

poses of this thesis, the data— we used only those questions
pertaining to the hypothesized statements— from the three
surveys were combined into one survey (the 1974 North Dakota
Pre-Election Survey).

The response rate for this consolidated

survey was 52 percent.
Our survey method for discovering the actual behavior
of voters conforms more closely to the methodology of DeVries
and Tarrance than most past voting studies.

Samuel Elders-

veid pointed out the pitfalls for measuring independence in
past electoral studies:
Unfortunately, up to now we have relied primarily
on two limited criteria for measuring "independence":
(1 ) some objective measure through the use of official
election statistics, such as a computation of splitticket voting or of the fluctuation in party percent
ages; (2 ) some subjective measure, such as asking
respondents in a survey whether they consider themselves
to be partisans or "independents". Neither is satis
factory. The first is too narrow and rigid; the latter

G3
may not reveal who actually are the independents. For
more reliable measures we need data on voting behavior,
attitudes, and predispositions, in order to determine
the accuracy of self-classification. Self-perceptions
may be completely erroneous.
To measure independence we must examine the actual
behavior of all voters.

DeVries and Tarrance claim that this

is a new method of looking at American voting behavior. 2 7
Some analysts may dispute the accuracy of a pre-election sur
vey to obtain the actual voting behavior of respondents.

In

our particular case, such an accusation would be unfounded.
To determine actual behavior, the respondents were asked who
they would vote for in the 1974 general election for U.S.
Senator, U.S. Congressman, and state Public Service Commis
sioner.

The survey results never deviated more than 6.5 per

cent from the actual election outcome.

Moreover, the North

Dakota survey results were more precise in two of the three
election contests.

For example, in the U.S. Congressional

race the pre-election survey projected that Mark Andrews
would receive 60.3 percent of the votes and that Byron Dorgan
would tally 39.2 percent.

The official abstract showed Andrews

garnering 55.7 percent of the votes casted and Dorgan receiving
44.3 percent.

The election results for both candidates only

deviated 4.6 percent from the survey's results.

Statistical

testing also confirmed the pi~eciseness of the pre-election survey.

The Chi-square Goodness-of-Fit Test is valid (x -3.7,

P=.72) .
2 ^Eldersveld, p. 737.

27

DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 39-55.
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Unlike earlier studies, our research does not rely on
self-perception.

Many times self-perception will fail to

identify Republicans, Democrats,, and those who actually are
crossing over party lines.

Our analysis uses results based

upon the respondent'' s answers to questions regarding his
actual voting behavior.

Self-perception is used only to

illustrate the accuracy of actual voting behavior.

In Table

7 we can see that the problem of self-perception and actual
behavior holds true for North Dakota,

The percentage of

voters who identified as Democrats (34,9%) is signficantly
less than those who voted straight Democratic ((28,0%),
Furthermore, if one contends that ticket-splitters are
independents, how does one account for the greater number of
split-tickets (42.8%) than Independents (32.6%)?

In 1974,

North Dakota's voters elected a Republican for U,5. Senator
(Milton R. Young), a Republican for U.S. Congressman (Mark
Andrews) , and a Republican for Public Service Commissioner
(Ben J, Wolf.) :; yet, only 29,2 percent of the voters actually
voted a straight Republican ticket.
When the statistics for self—perception are combined
with actual behavior, the outcome for the voters of North
Dakota is revealing (see Table 8 ),

We mentioned that many

more voters split their ballots than those who classified
themselves as independents.

Moreover, In Table ,8 observe

that only 52,2 percent of the ticket—splitters Identified
themselves as Independents,

But, 28,9 percent of the ballot-

splitters perceived themselves as Democrats and .18,9 percent
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'TABLE 7
DISPARITY BETWEEN SELF-PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR
ILLUSTRATED BY THE 1974 NORTH DAKOTA
PRE-ELECTION SURVEY
(N=2„027)
Perception and Behavior

%

Self-P er cep t.ion
Republican
Democrat
independent- - - - - - - - - - - - -

32.5
34.9
32.6
100.0

Voting Behavior
Voted Republican ticket- - - - - - Voted Democratic ticket- - - - - - Voted Split—tickets- - - - - - - - -

29.2
28.0
42.8
100.0

classified themselves as Republicans-

.After examining these

figures and the rest of Table 8 ,, \we must conclude that only
actual behavior can be relied -upon to properly identify the
true nature of voters..
Comparing the (North Dakota survey (('Table 8 ) with a
national survey ((Table 5>.)„ we are able to observe similar
findings-

The national ticket-splitter category, like North

Dakota"s„ is strongly comprised of partisan identifiers.
Inspecting Table 9 we can see that only -43-5 percent of the
independents are behavioral ticket—splitters.

Moreover, the

ticket- split ter "s grouping .includes 19-3 percent Republicans
and 32..'7 percent Democrats-

These last two observations are

closely related to the findings .in 'Table 8 for the North
Dakota ticket-splitter,.

Further comparison of the two surveys
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TABLE 8
COMBINED STATISTICS FOR SELF-PERCEPTION AND
ACTUAL VOTING BEHAVIOR FROM THE 1974
NORTH DAKOTA PRE-ELECTION SURVEY
(N=2,027)
Actual Voting Behavior (1 0 0 .0%)

Self-Perception

Straight
Republican
(29.2%)

81.2
Republican . . . ( 32.5%)
2.2
Democrat . . . . ( 34.9%)
16.6
Independent. . . ( 32.6%)
State Electorate(100.0%) 1 0 0 . 0

Split
Ticket
(42.8%)

Straight
Democrat
(28.0%)

18.9
28.9
52.2

2.3
78.3
19.4

100.0

100.0

reveals that North Dakota has a larger number of selfclassified independents (36.0%) voting a straight Democratic
or Republican ticket than what the national survey indicated
(26.9%).

However, in both surveys the significance of these

percentages is the sizable number of independents who are
voting straight party ballots.
The actual voting behavior data from Table 8 , trans
ferred to the Figure 1 diagram, offers us a handy method of
review.

All the claims or propositions regarding the ticket-

splitter, advocated by DeVries and Tarrance, seems to be evi
dent from our research that concentrated on North Dakota
voters.

DeVries and Tarrance claimed that self-perception

was a fallacious measurement of the way people voted.

In

Figure 1, this hypothesis is proven to be true when we observe
28 Ibid., p. 49.
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TABLE 9
1967 NATIONAL SURVEY
Actual Voting Behavior*
Straight
Republican

Split
Ticket

Straight
Democrat

79.3
5.5
13.5
1.7

19.3
32.7
43.5
4.5

81.5
13.4
2.9

(1 0 0 .0 %) 1 0 0 . 0

100.0

100.0

Self-Perception
Republican. . . .
Democrat........
Independent . . .
Other, Don't know
Total National
Electorate

( 25.7%)
( 44.9%)
( 25.1%)
( 4.3%)

2.2

SOURCE: Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The TicketSplitter: a New Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: William B. Eedmans Publishing Company, 1972), p. 53
♦Determined by asking how respondent voted in 1966 for
U.S. Senator, U.S. Congressman, state governor, etc.
that only 52.2 percent of the independents actually split
their vote between candidates of opposing parties.

What's

more, both the Republican and Democratic identifiers failed
to vote according to their self-classification or along
straight party lines.
Moreover, DeVries and Tarrance argued that many indepen
29
dents vote a straight-ticket and not a split-ballot.
Sur
veying Figure 1, we discovered that 36 percent of the selfperceived independents in North Dakota voted a straight party
ballot.

Furthermore, DeVries and Tarrance hypothesized that

the ticket-splitter category is comprised basically of
29 Ibid., pp. 51-55.

6B
Fig. 1. How Actual Voters in North
Dakota Consider Themselves (1974)
(N=2,027)
ACTUAL VOTING BEHAVIOR

SELF-PERCEPTION

conclude that 47.8 percent of the split-ticket voters came
from the ranks of the Democrats and the Republicans.

This

percentage is not as overwhelming as DeVries and Tarrance's
figures, 31 but. it does show that the ticket-splitter is
likely to be a partisan identifier and not just an indepen
dent.

In closing this section, our investigation of North

Dakota's electorate has shown us the error in using self
perception as the sole means for identifying all classes of
voters.

A more precise analysis, according to the voter’s

actual behavior, is the methodological measurement needed to
determine who is actually voting a Republican, Democratic, or
30 Ibid., p. 37.

31They discovered from thexr 1967 National Survey that
over 52 percent of the ticket-splitters thought of them
selves as Republicans or Democrats. DeVries and Tarrance,
p. 54.
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split-ballot.

The next section of this chapter will present

a socio-economic profile of the North Dakota ticket-splitter.
This profile fashions the ticket-splitter with the credibility
of being politically identifiable among the other political
classifications.
Socio-economic Characteristics of the
North Dakota Ticket-Splitter-^
The analysis of North Dakota's voters showed that many
characteristics apparent in the Republican identifiers could
also be attributed to the ticket-splitters (see Table 10}.
For example, in the occupational category the ticket-splitter
associates more closely with Republican identifiers than
32The questionnaire produced by the Bureau of Govern
mental Affairs did not ask respondents their income and edu
cational level. However, we do know the respondents' occu
pations. And, according to Walter L. Slocum, Occupational
Careers (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1-966), p. 5,
most sociologists use occupation as the principal indicator
of social class. Therefore, the status of an occupation is
directly correlated with an individual's income and educa
tion. Consequently, we are able to subjectively evaluate the
relative affluence of our respondents in our 1974 survey
according to their occupation. The best method of judging a
respondent's status, which gives a direct clue to his income
and education, is according to the occupational status class
ification adopted by the U.S. Bureau of Census for the 1970
census. The major categories of the occupational status
classification are:
"1. Professional, technical, and kindred worker
2. Managers and administrators, except farm
3. Sales workers
4. Clerical and kindred workers
5. Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
6 . Operatives, except transport
7. Transport equipment operatives
8 . Laborers, except farm
9. Farmers and farm managers
10. Farm laborers and farm foremen
11. Service workers, except private household
12. Private household workers"
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TABLE 10
SOCI.AL/ECONOMIC PROFILES OF BEHAVIORAL REPUBLICANS,
DEMOCRATS, AND TICKET-SPLITTERS
IN NORTH DAKOTA (1974)
(N” 2,81'4)
S tate V oting Behavior
Socio-economic
C h a ra c te ris tic s

Repub
lic a n

T ic k e tS p lit t e r

Demo
c ra t

T o ta l

Age
17 and under
18-24
25-31
35-49
50-64
over 65

.3%
10.4
12.0
25.4
30.6
21.2

.4 V.
24.1
22.0
22.4
20.5
10.5

.4%
13.0
13.7
25.9
30.5
16.5

.4%
17.2
16.0
24.1
26.2
15.3

Sex
Kale
Female

53.0
47.0

53(2
46.8

51.3
48.7

52.8
47.2

Occupation
R e tire d
Homemaker
P ro fe ssio n a l
Educator
Executive/Kanagers
and P ro p rie to r
Sales
W hite C o lla r / C iv il S ervice
S k ille d Labor
Semi and U n s k ille d Labor
Farmer
Student

13.7
30.0
4.1
3.8

7.2
25.9
3.9
6.1

13.5
28.1
2.9
3.8

10.8
27.5
3.8
4.8

9.9
4.9
4.4
6.1
4.9
14.5
3.6

7.3
5.3
4.0
10.6
5.7
11.8
12.2

4.9
4.0
4.7
11.1
7.5
13.8
5.6

7.4
4.8
4.3
9.6
5.9
13.2
7.9

Farm O rga niza tion
None
Farmers Union
NFO
Farm Bureau

68.6
13.0
.3
18.0

74.0
18.5
1.7
5.8

60.1
34.5
2.0
3.4

68.8
21.2
1.4
8.6

Union Member
Yc-s
No

4.1
95.9

9.7
90.3

11.9
60.1

6.6
91.4

83.3
16.7

65.8
33.2

66.9
33.1

71.6
28.4

27.7
10.6
20.6
41.1

26.1
10.1
20.6
43.2

30.4
9.1
19.5
40.9

27.9
10. 0
20.3
41.8

R e lig io n
P ro te s ta n t
C a th o lic
Community S ize-P lace o f
Residence
Farm
Town under 500
Town 500 to 2,500
Town over 2,500

-

>
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with Democratic partisans.

Examining Table 10 we can see

differences between the ballot-splitter and the party mem
bers.

The ticket-splitter, face-to-face with the partisans,

materializes as a voter who was younger (18-34 years) and
somewhat middle-aged (35-49 years).

The split-ticket voter's

religion is predominantly Protestant, but he was slightly
more Catholic than party partisans.

In addition, though an

urban setting is usually considered a stronghold for straight
party voting, 33 there is an indication from Table 10 that a
high incidence of ticket-splitting is occurring in urban North
Dakota.
The distinguishing features of the North Dakota ticketsplitter from Table 10 can be succinctly illustrated in
Table 11.

However, the conclusions in Table 11 which are

based on a socio-economic description of the ticket-splitter
population from Table 10, can be misleading when considered
independently.

The relative proportion of different socio

economic categories (e.g., age 18-34) in the full population
may be determinative of the percentage breakdown among the
ticket-splitters.^

The appropriate means to test any ten

dency of a socio-economic subgroup to manifest a higher level
"'Campbell and Miller, The Motivational Basis, pp. 296297.
34

For instance, 90.3 percent, of the ticket-splitters are
non-union but the respondent population in North Dakota is
91.4 percent non-union. The greater or lesser tendency of a
group to split its tickets can only be inferred by noting the
deviation of the percentage of the socio-economic group among
ticket-splitters from the group percentage in the full popula
tion (comparing column two in Table 10 with the totals column).
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TABLE 11
THE NORTH DAKOTA TICKET-SPLITTER PROFILE (1974)
(N=2,814)

Younger (18-34 years) and somewhat middle age (35-49
years) voter
Male
Executive/Managers/Proprietor
Professional
Educator
Sales
Non-Union
Skilled Labor
Non-Member of Farm Organizations
Student
Protestant but in North Dakota Catholic ticket-splitters
outnumber Catholic partisans
Community size: Equal proportionately to partisans in
all areas of residency; except, to some extent, more
ballot-splitters in towns over 2,500

of ticket-splitting than occurs in the full population is to
calculate the percentage of straight-ticket voters and ticketsplitters for each socio-economic variable category and then
compare resultant percentages across categories.
Table 12 expresses the survey data in terms of depen
dent variable percentages (in this case, percent who split
their tickets in the 1974 election) for each socio-economic
category.

This permits one to properly test the validity of

the profile drawn of the North Dakota ticket-splitters.

The

table establishes whether the characteristics of the typical
ticket-splitter can be differentiated from the modal char
acteristics of the survey population.

The relative strength

of ticket-splitting among the different socio-economic groups
is also measured in this way.

TABLE 12
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS AND LEVEL OF TICKET-SPLITTING

Socio-Economic
Characteristic
(with N)
N=

Level of
Ticket-Splitting

AGE
362
18-24
356
25-34
509
35-49
50-64
543
319 over 65

SEX
N= 1 1 0 0 Male
990 Female
OCCUPATION
N= 217 Retired
556 Homemaker
74 Professional
96 Educator
149 Executive
97 Sales
87 White Collar/
Civil Servant
190 Skilled Labor
120 Semi-Unskilled
264 Farmer
159 Student

62.4%
57.8
41.2
35.0
30.7

Maximum Percent
Difference Between
Highest & Lowest
Group
X 2 Value*

31.7%

120.3

Prohability

DF

5

<.001
-j
U>

44.9
43.9

1.0

.19

1

46.55

10

>.60

29.0
40.6
45.9
55.2
42.9
47.4
40.2
48.9
41.6
39.0
67.2

<.001

Table 12— Continued

Socio-Economic
Characteristic
(with N)

Level of
Ticket-Splitting

FARM ORGANIZATION
N= 1406 None
435 Farmers Union
28 NFO
177 Farm Bureau

47.8%
38.6
53.5
29.9

UNION MEMBER
N= 180 Yes
1893 No

49.4
44.0

RELIGION
N= 1440 Protestant
572 Catholic

41.3
51.5

COMMUNITY SIZE
N= 581 Farm
209 Town under 500
426 Town 500-2500
881 Town over 2500

41.8
44.9
45.0
45.7

Maximum Percent
Difference Between
Highest & Lowest
Group

Value

Prob
ability

DF

29.19

3

<.001

5.4

1.99

1

> .10

10.2

17.45

1

<.001

2.23

3

>.70

17.9%

3.9

*Chi-square tests statistical independence of socio-economic categories crosstabulated with voting behavior response (straight ticket/ticket-splitter).
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Bivariate analysis of the data also permitted tests
of statistical significance of any difference in ticketsplitting behavior between different socio-economic cate
gories.

The survey data was computer analyzed with a SPSS 5

program which cross-tabulated the socio-economic data with
the voter behavior responses and generated a full spectrum
of non-parametric statistics.
This bivariate analysis permitted the testing of
several basic hypotheses in association between socio
economic characteristics and ticket-splitting.

The basic

background characteristics explored i.n the questionnaire and
covered in Table 10 were the object of several hypotheses.
Expressed as null hypotheses they are as follows:
(1) There is no significant difference between voters
in different age groups in their tendency to vote
a split-ticket.
(2) There is no significant difference between male
and female voters in their tendency to vote a
split-ticket.
(3) There .is no significant difference between mem
bers of different occupational groups within
the state in their tendency to vote a splitticket.
35

The hypotheses are expressed as null hypotheses
because insufficient data exists in the literature to estab
lish directional and substantive hypotheses.
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(4) There is no significant difference between farm
organization members and non-members in their
tendency to vote a split-ticket.
(5) There is no significant difference between members
of different farm organizations in their tendency
to vote a split-ticket.
(6 ) There is no significant difference between Prot
estant and Catholic voters in their tendency
to vote a split-ticket.
(7) There is no significant difference between voters
residing in communities of different size in their
tendency to vote a split-ticket.
The tests of these hypotheses is given in Table 12
which indicate the level of ticket-splitting within each
independent variable category, the maximum percentage of dif
ference between compared groups, the Chi-square value of the
bivariate relationship, and the probability of such relation
ship occurring by chance.
In a review of Table 12, several significant relation
ships were uncovered.

They involve the variable of age, occu

pation, religion, and farm organization membership.

Age, in

fact, demonstrates a very consistent decreasing tendency to
vote a split-ticket with membership in an increasing age
group:
Age Level

18-24

25-34

Straight-Ticket

37.6 — —) 42.2

Split-Ticket

62.4 f —

35-49

50-64

over 65

58.8— -"7* 65.0 — ^ 69.3

57.8 4*”"" 41.2 4"’""* 35.0

- 30.7
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Not only Is there a statistical significance between
age groups, the differences are consistent by directional
and an ordinal association is indicated.

The strength of

the relationship is measured through Kendall's tan C.

The

Kendall tau C for this relationship is -.258 indicating a
moderate ordinal relationship; Probability is less than .001.
The occupation variable provided some significant dis
tinctions between occupational groups in their tendency to
ticket-split.

The Chi-square measures total deviation of all

groups so one must look to individual cell deviations from
expected frequencies to isolate the distinctive occupations.
In this instance retired respondents engaged in ticket
splitting significantly less than other groups and students
and to a lesser extent skilled labor and sales personnel
split their tickets significantly more than other groups.
Religion also furnished a significant relationship.
The difference between Protestants and Catholics in ticket
splitting tendencies is 10.2 percent, Catholic ticketsplitters (50.9%) actually outnumber Catholic straight-ticket
Republicans (16.8%) and Catholic Democrats (31.1%) put together.
This is expected.

Catholics in North Dakota have a higher

percentage of Democrat identifiers than Protestants (43.8%
vs. 29.2%) and a higher percentage of independent identifiers
than Protestants (37.4% vs. 33.1%).
Finally, farm organization membership furnished an
interesting bit of information.

Both the non-farm organiza

tion member and Farmers Union member did not deviate markedly
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from the general level of ticket-splitting (37.2%) but there
was a marked difference in behavior of NFO and Farm Bureau
members.

NFO members had a split-ticket level of 42.9 percent

while Farm Bureau members had a ticket-splitting level of 25.9
percent.

The direction of the difference is expected.

NFO

members pride themselves on the independent direction of their
farm policies and Farm Bureau members have in many cases a
strong Republican orientation (55.1% Farm Bureau members are
Republicans outnumbering Democrats [16.2%] and Independents
[28.1%]) that is associated with straight-ticket voting.
Sex, union membership, and community size, however,
indicated no special tendencies on the part of any subgroup
to ticket-split significantly more or less than the state
norm.

In most cases ticket-splitting levels were close to

identical for groups under comparison.
Our next step will be a comparison of our North Dakota
ticket-splitter profile (Table 11) with a national ticketsplitter profile (Table 13).

The study that produced this

1967 national profile (Table 13) concluded
that the national ticket-splitter had a good many of
the characteristics attributed to the Republican
voter, though he was somewhat younger, more often
Catholic, more often a suburbanite or resident of a
middle-size city, and a member of a larger family.
It can easily be seen that the two profiles are defi
nitely similar.

Basic features of the North Dakota ticket-

splitter are evident in the national ticket-splitter profile.
3£>

DeVries and Tarrance, p. 61.
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The close proximity between the two profiles is distinctively
shown in several categories— by occupation,, age, and reli
gion to name a few-

Moreover, the comparison between the

two profiles intensifies the belief of a national ticket
splitting phenomenon and,, at the same time, it corroborates
the idea that the ticket-splitter is a viable force in North
Dakota-

The socio-economic characteristics of the ballot-

splitter enable his performance as a voter to be ranked
according to rationality, interestedness, and involvement.
DeVries and Tarrance tried to demonstrate that the
behavioral ticket-splitter and the self—classified independent were not one and the same voter.

Our research did

not exhibit an overwhelming demarcation between the ticketsplitter and the independent.

Consequently,, in Table 14 you

will be able to observe that there is an overlap between the
self-classified independent and the actual ticket—splitter
in North Dakota.

However, it should be noted that the tradi

tionally self-perceived independent and the behavioral ticketsplitter are not synonymous.

Moreover, in Table 14 you can

see this difference by examining the percentages in the reli
gion category-

The self-identified independent is represented

by 30.9 percent of the Catholics while the behavioral ticketsplitter boasts a 33.2 percent Catholic membership.

Other

differences that separate the ticket-splitter from the inde
pendent are indicated in the community size classification.
In all four resident categories there is an obvious
37

Ibid., pp. €7-72.
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diversity between the two voters.

Finally, when viewing Table

14, do not overlook some of the significant differences between
self-perceived and behavioral Republicans and Democrats.
TABLE 13
THE NATIONAL TICKET-SPLITTER PROFILE
(N=l ,169)
High school graduate
Some college, graduate to post-graduate
High and middle income ($7,000-24,999)
Younger (21-29 years) and middle years (30-59)
Professional/technical
Managers/officials/owners
Clerical/sales workers
Operatives and kindred workers
Non-union
Male
American born white
Protestant but also somewhat Catholic
Married
Community size: 2,500 to 499,999
Homeowner
SOURCE: Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The TicketSplitter: A New Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids, Michi
gan: William B. Eedmans Publishing Company, 1972), p. 61.
In summary, it can easily be verified that North Dakota
normally votes in a Republican manner.

Consequently, one

would assume a minimum of ballot-splitting taking place
within the state.

However, we have evaluated certain miti

gating conditions which modify to a certain degree the onepartyism of North Dakota.

These circumstances do not

necessarily represent a cause-effect relationship that leads
directly to ballot-splitting.

But, these mitigating aspects

may be supporting an atmosphere where ticket-splitting would
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TABLE 14
SOCIAL/ECONOMIC PROFILES OF NORTH DAKOTA VOTERS
BASED UPON PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR (1974)
(N* 2,BI4>
Respondent s:
Republican

P erception and Behavior

Independent

Democrat

T-S

Perceivcd

24.6
26.9
24.1
17.7
7.1

.4%
24.1
22.0
22.4
20.5
10.5

16.4
15.6
23.1
26.8
17.4

. 4%
13.0
13.7
25.9
30.5
16.5

53.0
47.0

55.7
44.3

53.2
46.8

49.2
50.8

51.3
48.7

13.7
30.4
4.0
4.4

13.7
30.0
4.1
3.0

5.4
22,4
4.2
7.8

7.2
25.9
3.9
6.1

12.9
29.5
2.9
4. 1

13.5
28.1
2.9
3.8

8.2
5.0

9.9
4.9

9.2
5.8

7. 3
5.3

4.8
3.5

4.9
4.0

4.4
5.6

4.4
6.1

5.1
10.0

4.0
10.6

3.9
11.1

4.7
11.1

5.3
14.2
4.9

4.9
14.5
3.6

6.3
12.1
11,9

5.7
11.8
12.2

6.7
13.7
7.0

7.5
13.8
5.6

Farm O rg a nisa tion
None
Farmers Union
NFO
Farm Bureau

70.5
13.9
1.0
14.6

68.6
13.0
.3
18.0

77.6
IS . 1
.7
6.'6

74.0
18.5
1.7
5.6

60. 3
33. 3
2.4
4.0

60.1
34.5
2.0
3.4

Union Member
Yes
No

4.2
95.8

4.1
95.9

9. 3
90.7

9.7
90.3

11.3
88.7

11.9
88. 1

R e lig io n
■Protestant
C a th o lic

83.5
16.5

83.3
16.7

69.1
30.9

66.8
33.2

62.8
37.2

66.9
33.1

Community S ize-P lace o f
Residence
Fa rm
Town under 500
Town 500 to 2,500
Town over 2,500

28.8
10.0
21.2
40.0

27.7
10.6
20.6
41.1

23.8
7.5
18.6
50.1

26.1
10. 1
20.6
43.2

31.4

30.4
9.1
19.5
40.9

Socio-economic
C h a ra c te ris tic s

Perceived

Behavio r a l

Ind.

Age
17 and under
18-24
25-35
35-49
50-64
over 65

.7*
11.7
11.1
25.6
30.4
20.5

. 3V
10.4
12.0
25.4
30.6
31.2

Sex
Kale
Female

50.2
<9.8

O ccupation
R e tire d
Homemaker
P ro fe s s io n a l
Educator
executive/M anagers
and P ro p rie to r
Sales
White C o lla r / C iv il
S e rvice
S k ille d Labor
Semi and U n s k ille d
Labor
Fa rme r
Student

.it

.1%

9. e

20.9
37.8

Behavio r a l

1
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more likely occur.

And, from the research, it is apparent

that ballot-splitting is a phenomenon that is part of the
political life in the Peace Garden State.
The discrepancy between self-perception and actual
voting behavior persists in North Dakota.

In the 1974

general election, 42.8 percent of North Dakota's voters split
their ballot.

Of these ticket-splitters, 47.8 percent were

partisan identifiers.

These results conform to the conclu

sions reached by DeVries and Tarrance.

The socio-economic

characteristics of the North Dakota ticket-splitter, however,
are not identical to the national projected profile.

Never

theless, it is clearly evident that North Dakota's ticketsplitter closely resembles the national image and that he
possesses distinctive characteristics which separate him from
other political classifications in this state.

Finally,

there can be little doubt that the ticket-splitters in
North Dakota are a viable force and must be contended with
politically.
The North Dakota survey analysis was not equipped to
infer what actually causes ticket-splitting in North Dakota.
In Chapter IV, however, we will investigate some of the
trends in the nation that have had considerable effects on
ballot-splitting.

CHAPTER IV
DETERMINANTS THAT PROMOTE THE
BALLOT-SPLITTING PHENOMENON
American politics in the last tv/o decades has been
accentuated by the increased and unrelenting practice of
ballot-splitting.

This ticket-splitting phenomenon has also

permeated all election levels (national, state, and local).
Furthermore, it is probably safe to assume that crossover
voting is not endemic to one political locale.

Rather, it

is a political force with which all political aspirants
must contend.

Yet, we know little of the reasons why ticket

splitting has flourished so successfully.

Consequently,

this thesis has an obligation to present to the concerned
and inquisite individual the primary factors that have con
tributed to the sudden growth of ballot-splitting.

This

chapter will attempt to fulfill that obligation by discern
ing the foremost determinants of ticket-splitting: the wither
ing of party loyalty; increased education and affluence; the
influence of mass media, particularly television; incumbency
status of a candidate; and finally, the physical character
istics of a ballot.
A principal condition that has aided the burgeoning
of crossover voting is what Walter Dean Burnham has titled,
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"electoral disaggregation" or the gradual withering of
party loyalty.. ^

One of the legacies perpetuated by The

American Voter is that party identification is considered
relatively stable over a period of time or that there is
JLittle fluctuation in one".s political identification.

2

Nevertheless,, the breakdown of party adherence is noticeable
,by examining the three self— perceived party identification
-categories (Democratic,, Republican., and independent) .

As

Table 15 indicates,, In the latter half of the 196 0's there
has been an unexpected rise in the number of independents.
Conversely,, there has ibeen a notable drop in the number of
strong party identifiers..

'The most abrupt rate of desertion

for the strong identifiers comes from the Democrats,
however,, it is evident that there has been a steady decrease
of .strong Republican identifiers.. The number of independents
,(.29%) by 196 6 .was higher,, for the first time, than the number
of strong identifiers ,(28%)..

The years following 1966

revealed that the percentages of independents remained pro
portional to the percentage of strong identifiers.

Moreover,

this increase and its apparent stability is an indication
that the independent grouping will probably be an unremitting
and lasting change..

The new surge of independence undoubtedly

increased the ranks of the ticket— splitter.
further electoral disaggregation is seen by what many
^Burnham,, The /American Political Arena, p. 253.
2

“Campbell et a l „ The American Voter, pp. 148-149.
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TABLE 15
THE DECLINE OF PARTY: MOVEMENTS IN
PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1940-1969

Year

Independent

Strong
Democratic

Strong
Republican

Total Strong
Identifiers

1940
1944
1948
1952
1956

20
20
19
23
20

23
23

14
16

37
39

1960
1962
1964
1965
1966

23
22
23
23
29

21
24
27

16
13
11

37
37
38

18

10

28

1967
1968
1969

31
28
30

23

9

32

SOURCE: Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the
Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1970), p. 121.
call the unresponsiveness of the two major parties.

In the

past, American political parties have never been considered
"initiators of change" but they have been required to be
3
"responsive to change."
Many Americans believe today, how
ever, that parties are failing to deal effectively with
3
Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., American Political Parties:
Social Change and Political Response (New York: W.W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 311.
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problems pertaining to our technological society.

For

instance, many young Americans accuse the parties of lacking
responsiveness for environmental concerns.

Another stigma

attached to parties is the claim that when they are trying
to resolve problems they are plagued by procrastination and
ineffective decision-making.

The troublesome situation for

parties is described by Walter Dean Burnham in the following
excerpt:
It is certain that the significance of party as a link
between government and the governed has now come once
again into serious question. Bathed in the warm glow
of diffused affluence, vexed in spirit but enriched by
our imperial military and space commitments, confronted
by the gradually unfolding consequences of social change
as vast as it is unplanned, what need have Americans of
political parties? More precisely, why do they need
parties whose structures, processes and leadership cadres
seem torgrow more remote and irrelevant to each new
crisis? ' 1
Consequently, the unaccountable image portrayed by
parties has influenced a large number of newcomers entering
the political waters to veer from the enticements of the two
major parties.

This self-perceived

political identification

aversion is indicated by the June 1968 Gallup survey; the
largest number of those who identify as independents (40%) is
located in the 21-29 year old bracket.

Furthermore, when

4

Directly related to the efficiency of political
parties is how people generally feel about the American
political system. Therefore, a 1970 Gallup survey found
that 63 percent of the respondents felt "that the American
political system does not respond quickly enough to meet the
needs of the people." Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2283.
5

Burnham, The American Political Arena, p. 257.

GGallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2137.
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examining the political identity of college students, an
even greater independence is registered.

In the December

1969 Gallup survey, 52 percent of the college students con7
sidered themselves as independents.
Not only has there been
an increase in independent voters but there seems to be concrete evidence of a more "qualitative voter."

8

This indepen

dent population does not submit to the description of the
uninvolved and inattentive independent perpetuated by The
American Voter.

On the contrary, many of these independents

(i.e., ticket-splitters) will vote intelligently for different
party candidates and according to the appeals of the issues.
Finally, the political behavior of voters is gradually
averting future commitments to the parties.

One of the

most significant catalysts involved in the aversion process
has been split-ticket voting.

The simultaneous practice of

ticket-splitting and the decline of straight-ticket voting
is made obvious in Table 16.

Moreover, not only has there

been a steady disintegration of party voting at the state
and local level according to Table 16, but it also shows a
similar phenomenon occurring at the national level when
respondents answered the question whether they voted for a
different or the same party's presidential candidate in con
secutive elections.7
*
7 Ibid., p. 2227.

^Burnham, The American Political Arena, p. 256.
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TABLE 16
THE DECLINE OF PARTY: EVIDENCES FROM
SURVEY DATA, 1948-1966
1948 1952 1956 1958 1960 1962

Category
Straight ticket,
state and local
Same party's presi
dential candidate

1964

1966

72

74

71

70

73

58

60

50

—

68

58

59

54

56

58

46

SOURCE: Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the
Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1970), p. 120.
The mixture of increased education and affluence has
promoted ballot-splitting as effectively as the erosion of
party loyalties has accomodated it.

The swift expansion of

the college-educated in the last two decades is illustrative
of our growing educated society.

In 1940, 16 percent of

those who were 18-21 years old were enrolled in college.
1956, the percentage had increased to 30 percent.

By

And by

1968, there were 34 percent of those aged 18-21 matriculated
.
m

college.

9

T,he 8.2 million students attending college in

1973 was an extraordinary jump from the 1.5 million students
in 1940.

Consequently, the mass of college students9
*

9Ladd, Jr., p. 272.

•^U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1974') 7 pp. 109-110.
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became reflected in the phenomenal increase of "white
collar workers" [this group does not consist wholly of
college graduates], "professionals and technicals," and
"managers, officials (salaried)

1 1 12
3 Isolating college pro

fessors from the above aggregation, as an example of this
quick growth rate, we find that there were 147,000 professors
. 1940, and in
. 1968, this number grew to more than 600,000. 12
in
The fast growing educated society in America has pro
duced voters who are better equipped to discern the issues
and recognize the real ability of all candidates.

These

voters will not be harnessed by party commitments and will
move freely about the ballot selecting the most qualified
nominees.

Furthermore, we know from Chapter III that the

ticket-splitter is largely from this educated middle class.
The affluence of the American society goes hand-in-hand
with the expanding number of educated Americans.

In the

past, most Americans were concerned with the economic necessity
of obtaining food, clothing, and shelter or the subsistencetype problems.

Today, however, a majority of Americans are

no longer handcuffed b y the subsistence-type tensions.
Moreover, the American society in general has been labeled
1 1 Ladd, Jr., p. 280, Table 6.2.
1 2 Ibid., p. 279.

13 This was at least true until the early 1970's; how
ever, because we are today plagued by inflationary and
recessional problems, it is difficult to foresee the long
term trends and effects these conditions will have on the
American economy.
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the "affluent society" because of the sudden increase of
wealth for Americans during the 1950"s and 1960's . ^

For

example, the medium family income in 1947 was $3,000; this
figure quickly rose to $5,,783 in 1951; and in 1971, the
15
medium family income climbed to $10,.,285..
American affluence enmeshed .with educational advance
ments has unleashed a greater .sense of independence in many
■voters.

This independence finds its security in its newly

discovered membership from which it is able to call to its
attention massive pecuniary resources.

These ticket-splitters,

whether they perceive themselves as Democrats, Republicans,
or independents,, find no consolation in committing themselves
wholeheartedly to .all the dictums of the political parties,
especially the uncompromising loyalty that parties demand for
their nominated candidates..

.Consequently, the true indepen

dent voter or ticket—splitter relishes his freedom and feels
competent enough to judge the candidates and issues according
to what political information has been made readily available
to him.
Today,, moreover,, voters can more easily assess a cam
paign because of the thorough coverage -given the candidates
H6
and the issues by the mass media.. ' This coverage has
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960) , pp.. 1-3..
15XJ..S.. Bureau of Census,, p.. 370, F.xg.uxe 25.
IL.g
°To understand the influence of the media on politics,
■see Robert. Agranoff, 'The New Style in Election Campaigns
((Bostons Holbrook (Press,, Inc..,, 1972)..
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influenced voters to rely less on parties and more on splitticket voting.

And in the realm of communication, greater

influence on campaigns is being controlled by electronic
media, especially television.

Examining the usefulness of

television, however, many would agree with Joe McGinnis when
he says, "television seems particularly useful to the politi■j7
cian who can be charming but lacks ideas."
Conversely,
many political analysts and consultants see eye-to-eye with
Herbert Alexander's view of television and its relationship
to the voter:
. . . television provides the feeling of direct con
tact between the speaker and the viewer. It seems to
turn the nation into a huge town meeting? the problem is
that the citizen observes but he cannot participate, and
he may allow viewing to substitute for personal partici
pation. Television would seem to have the power to
cement the links between the political leadership and the
people. Clearly, television has the capacity to make the
electorate direct witnesses to political history by making
available congressional hearings, political conventions,
election night activities, debates between candidates,
news events, and interviews and documentaries.-"*-8
In addition, DeVries and Tarrance state that the tradi
tional "selling" of candidates will play less of a role in
the 1970's.

The reason for this transition, they claim, is

that voters, particularly ticket-splitters, base their elec
toral decisions on information not directly controlled by1
*
7
17

doe McGinnis, The Selling of the President, 1968
(New York: Trident Press, 1969) ,~ p. 29.
■^Herbert E. Alexander, "Broadcasting and Politics,"
in The Electoral Process, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon
Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), p. 99.
19DeVries and Tarrance, p . 119.
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candidates, such as television newscasts, editorials, specials,
and documentaries.

20

The incumbency status of an elected official is another
factor that has caused voters to defect from one specific
The old aphorism, "few die and none resign," 21 does

party.

seem appropriate when you consider the number of incumbents
in public office.

Nevertheless, the success rate of incum

bents returning to their political office has been extremely
high.

For instance, U.S. Senators win re-election with 80

percent success; U.S. Congressmen return at a 90 percent
rate; governors stop their opponents 64.7 percent of the time;
90 percent of the state legislators are returned to power;
and about 80 percent of the city councilmen are victorious.

22

The incumbent office holder is able to return to power
with such consistency because of certain advantages inherent
in his being an incumbent.

Warren Lee Kostroski states three

advantageous reasons fox' incumbents being able to perpetuate
their political position:
1. The incumbent is likely to have substantial polit
ical skill and experience, and often a superior political
organization, owing to his having been through the mill,
successfully, at least once previously.
2. He should enjoy greater voter recognition than
his opponent through having been in the public eye during2
*
1
0
20 Ibid., pp. 75-85.
21

Clem Miller, Member of the House (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1962), p. 93, quoted in Warren Lee Kostroski,
"Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends,
Patterns, and Models," American Political Science Review 67
(December, 1S73):1215.
’’
"
22
Kostroski, p. 1213.
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the last campaign and during the preceding years of his
term, through his use of the franking privilege, the
carrying out of casework, appearances at public events,
and so forth. This simple fact of public awareness can
prove incredibly powerful.
3.
The office-holder is likely to have a fair amount
of political clout within his party because of patronage,
fund-raising activities, prestige, favors of all kinds.
This should make it easier for him to acquire a wide
variety of campaigp^resources, from workers, to infor
mation, to credit.
Consequently, the incumbent's image appears irre
sistibly attractive to voters.
a voter can be seen in Table 17.

The incumbent's influence on
As Table 17 reveals, when

a respondent's political identification "supports" itself
with both the senatorial and gubernatorial incumbent, there
is a high level of straight-ticket voting.

Conversely, when

a voter's identification "conflicts" with either the senato
rial or gubernatorial incumbent, there is a lower level of
straight-ticket voting or increased ticket-splitting.
Furthermore, Table 17 indicates that party ties are stronger
in off-year state elections.
The voter who defects from his party to vote for an
incumbent of the opposing party has been accused of splitting
his ticket because he is considered uninformed and irrational
in his decision-making.

Furthermore, The American Voter

suggested that straight-ticket voting was voting according to
an awareness of the issues and the candidates.

This party

voter was informed and involved with the campaign . 2324
2 3 Ibid., p. 1223.

24
'Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 89-145.

TABLE 17
STRAIGHT AND SPLIT-TICKET VOTING FOR U.S. SENATOR AND GOVERNOR
BY TYPE OF CONFLICT/SUPPORT CONDITION
Senatorial
Incumbency
Status

Gubernatorial
Incumbency
Status

Straight
R's own
Party

Split: R's own
Party for Sen.,
opposite for Gov.

Split: R :s own
Party for Gov.,
opposite for Sen.

Straight
opposite
Party

(N)

Nonpresidential Elect ions
(Pyramided Sample: 1966, 1970)
supports
supports
conflicts
conflicts

supports
conflicts
supports
conflicts

74%
63
69
65

7%
33
5
16

12 %
0

17
7

5%
5
9
12

(82)
(40)
(42)
(99)

Presidential Elections
(Pyramided Sample: 1954, 1968)
supports
supports
conflicts
conflicts

supports
conflicts
supports
conflicts

63%
59
57
87

17%
32
6

4

11%

4
26
4

4%
6
12

4

(54)
(1 1 1 )
(51)
(23)

SOURCE: Andrew T. Cowart, "Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects,
Partisan Forces, and Divergent Partisan Majorities," American Political Science Review 67
(September, 1973):849.
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Nevertheless, just as a political party will guide and aid a
voter in making the right selection between candidates, the
incumbency status of a nominee will also help the voter
differentiate between candidates.

The incumbent officeholder

is in constant view of the voters and at election time, the
ballot-splitter bases his judgment according to what he has
seen of the ability of the candidates.

Therefore, it is

likely that a split-ticket vote for an incumbent is an
acceptance of a candidate and the job he has done.

This

acceptance of the status quo is not an irrational or unin
formed choice, but is based on the best possible evidence
available.
Finally, the form of the ballot itself is a determinant
of ticket-splitting.

It has been shown that states that

offer a single lever to pull for a party-ticket have a
greater level of straight-ticket voting than those states
25
that have multiple levers.
Moreover, some recent changes
in the physical structure of a ballot have encouraged ticket
splitting.

For example, in some southern states a change in

voting regulations has made it easier for a voter to split
his ballot.

In 1972, Mississippians, for the first time,

were able to cross party lines.

The new Mississippi law pro

vides that
, . - no person shall be eligible to participate in
any primary election unless he intends to support the
nominations made in the primary in which he participates
. . . ; provided, however, that nothing herein is
25
Campbell and Miller, The Motivational Basis,
pp. 307-308.
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intended or shall ever be understood as applying to
elections for president or vice-president of the
United States, wherein votes may be cast entirely
without regard to party lines and without any penalty
for so doing.
In other words, Sec. of State Ladner explained,
"a voter may legally cast his ballot for any slate of
electors which appears on the ballot and then cross
party lines and vote for the candidates of his choice,
whether Democrat, Republican, or Independent."^
In North Carolina, "nobody can ride anybody's coat
tails because they are d i s e n g a g e d , s a i d Alex Brock, state
director of elections.

They are disengaged because on both

machine and paper ballots the presidential contest is divided
from state and local races; this makes it impossible to pull
a single lever for one party (see Appendix F for North Caro
lina' s ballot).
Nevertheless, no matter what has been said about the
structure of a ballot and its relationship to voting, some
analysts express uncertainty as to what extent ticket
splitting is really induced by the physical characteristics
of a ballot.

For instance, Jerrold G. Rusk does not deny

that the introduction of the Australian ballot did have
important effects on split-ticket voting; however, he does
2 £>

Charles M. Hills, Jr. Party Crossover Legal in
State this Election (Areata Microfilm Corp., NewsBank,
Political Development, Card 172, August 1972), p. B 8 .
27
Ferrel Guillory. Ballot Form May Boast N.C.
Ticket-Splitting (Areata Microfilm Corp., NewsBank, Politi
cal Development, Card 190, September 1972), p. F 8 .
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9R
add that a ballot form and future "institutional properties"'^
might just have an immediate impact and, like so many other
novelties, the newness wears off leaving a normal pattern. 29
In summary, this chapter has tried to discuss some of
the foremost reasons for ballot-splitting, however, this dis
cussion does not claim to have examined all possible causes.
Moreover, reviewing the major determinants of ballot
splitting, it is important to remember that ticket-splitting
cannot be explained by one simple cause.

Rather, the complex

ity of ballot-splitting is such that it requires to be
described as a combination of a number of determinants.
In conclusion, the increased and unremitting practice
of ticket-splitting must be accepted as a reality in the
American political setting.

Furthermore, ballot-splitters,

like all other political participants, must be politically
discerned according to a new methodology.

This new method

ology uncovers the political identity of the electorate by
relying on a voter's actual behavior and not in accordance
with the voter's own self-perception.
28

In other words, the

According to Rusk's article:
"By 'institutional properties' are meant those laws,
customs, and norms that define and regulate the broader
entity known as the electoral system. Such things as
registration requirements, electoral qualification laws,
voting systems (e.g., plurality, proportional representa
tion systems), ballot and voting machine arrangements,
and the like are the framework of the system."
29
Jerrold G. Rusk, "The Effect of the Australian
Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908," American
Political Science Review 64 (December 1970):1220-1238.
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true test of independence will be determined by how one acts
instead of how one thinks of himself.

Finally, the contem

porary psephos is embodied with a rationality that enables
him to judge the candidates and issues on their own merits.
However, this rationality can only prevail if the American
electorate is presented intelligent and not superficial
political information.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

'Terms that Designate Different Kinds
of Independent Voting-11 . Independents; Persons who are truly independent
in their political thinking (in a normative sense) and will
refuse to be classified into either of the two major parties.
However,., their true independence in actual voting situations
is today confused, as many persons use the independent label
as only a political screen- Traditionally, tire independent
is seen as less politically involved than regular party mem
bers, and having only a very marginal effect on tire election
process.

2. Swing Voters: Persons who traditionally are
thought to hold the "balance of power" in any election.
These voters are actually ticket-splitters who are located
disproportionately in certain geographic areas of a district
or a .state,, and can be identified using aggregate election
statistics,
3. Switch Voter; Generally a person who votes for
one party in one election, .and then for a different party in
a later election, though he could also be a person who splits
his ballot in a single election. He is considered to be less
politically involved than the ticket-splitter, and he tends
to evaluate the party performances ever a longer span of time.
4. Party S hifters: Persons who change their minds
during a single election. These people make a pre-election
choice to vote for one candidate but then shift over to the
opposite candidate near the end of the campaign. These
voters tend to be moved especially by issues and the candi
dates' personalities.
5. Floating Voter: Generally a British label for
voters who change their party preferences between elections.
They are consistently straight-ticket voters, but with either
party, over many elections.
6 - Ticket-Splitter; An involved voter who rationally
splits his ballot from President to state legislative races

it
'Definitions for these independent voting terms were
obtained from DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 125-126.
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in a single election and tends to split his vote in suc
cessive elections. He is basically a Republican or Democrat
who splits off occasionally to vote for a candidate of
another party.

Appendix B
TABLE 18
THE PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF THE ELECTORATE
(1940-1972)
1940 1944 1947 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972
41%

41%

46%

47%

47%

44%

47%

46 %

47%

51%

45%

45%

44%

40%

Indepen
dents

20

20

21

22

22

24

19

23

23

22

28

29

31

35

Republicans

38

29

27

27

27

29

29

27

27

24

25

24

24

23

Nothing,
Don't Know

1

-

7

4

4

3

5

4

3

2

2

2

1

2

TOTAL
n=

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

7

■?

(Gal lup)

99% 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 %

1287 1514 1139 1772 1269 3021 1317 1571 1291 155 8 1507 2705
(NORC)

(Survey Research Center)

SOURCE: William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingaie, Political Behavior of the American
Electorate, 3d ed., (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1975), p. 52.
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Democrats

Appendix C
A Paradigm of Voting in State "X" 2
To understand how split-ticket voters do control the
outcome of competitive elections, examine the following
theoretical paradigm. Assume that we conduct a survey in
state X which reveals that the state's voters consider
themselves as follows:
SELF-PERCEPTION
Democrats
Republicans
Independents
Don't Know

43.3 %
28.9
26.6
1.2
100.0

%

State X appears to be a predominantly Democratic state
with a 14.4% edge over Republicans. Assume that there are
one million voters in state X and that voter turnout will be
100% except for the "don't knows." There will be 433,000
Democrats, 289,000 Republicans, and 266,000 self-classified
independents. Neither party has the required 500,000 votes
to win by itself. The Republicans disadvantage is obvious.
However, when we calculate the actual vote strength in
the model state (with a 98.8% turnout of the one million
voters) the coalitions or vote alignments become clear:
ACTUAL BEHAVIOR

Republican Party
223,108 Republicans who voted straight Republican ticket
72,086 Independents who voted straight Republican ticket
19,918 Democrats who voted straiqht Republican ticket
total: 315,112

This hypothetical model was adopted from DeVries and
Tarranee, pp. 131-134.
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ACTUAL BEIIAVIOR-Continued

Democratic Party
265,862 Democrats who voted straight Democratic ticket
29,260 Independents who voted straight Democratic ticket
3,179 Republicans who voted straight Democratic ticket
total:~298,301
Ticket-Splitters
164,654 Independents who voted a split ticket
147,220 Democrats who voted a split ticket
62,713 Republicans who voted a split ticket
total: 374,587
Despite the survey results showing that only 28.9% of
the total eligible voters considered themselves Republicans,
the Republican candidate in our model state would actually
have more votes than the Democratic candidate if the ticketsplitters were excluded (315,112 to 298,301). However, there
were nearly 375,000 ticket-splitters who clearly held the
balance of power in this election.
The ticket-splitters cast more votes than either the
Republicans or the Democrats.
(Of the total vote, 32.1% of
all votes cast straight Republican ballots, 30% straight
Democratic ballots, and 38% split-ticket ballots.)

Appendix D
DeVries and Tarrance's Voting Option Scheme

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

to
From non-voting
to
From non-voting
to
From non-voting
to
From non-voting
From straight Republican to
From straight Republican to
From straight Republican to
From straight Republican to
From straight Democratic to
From straight Democratic to
From straight Democratic to
From straight Democratic to
From minor party
to
From minor party
to
From minor party
to
From minor party
to
From split ticket
to
From split ticket
to
From split ticket
to
From split ticket
to
Continue non-voting
Continue straight Republican
Continue straight Democratic
Continue minor party
Continue split ticket

-3

straight Republican
straight Democratic
straight minor party
split ticket
non-voting
straight Democratic
straight minor party
split ticket
non-voting
straight Republican
straight minor party
split ticket
non-voting
straight Republican
straight Democratic
split ticket
non-voting
straight Republican
straight Democratic
straight minor party

3This voting option scheme can be found in its entirety
in DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 127-130.
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Appendix E
Citizens Advisory Survey^
Bureau of Governmental Affairs-University of North Dakota
Political Issues
Below are sane of the election contests in 1974. If the election were being held today and
this was your ballot, how do you think you would vote?
Republican

Democrat

Independent

U.S. Senator

Milton R. Young [ ] William L.
"Bill” Guy

James Jungrcth

Undecided
[ ] Don't Know

[]

[]
Kenneth C.
Gardner, Jr. [ ]

U.S. Congress

Mark Andrews

Public Service Camtissioner Ben Wolf

[ ] Byron L. Dorgan [ ]

Don't Know

[]

[ ] Byron Knutson

Don't Know

[j

[]

Generally speaking, which party would do the best job running the 1975 North Dakota
Legislature?
___1.

Republicans___2.

Democrats ___ 3.

About the same ___4.

Not sure

A
"This sample questionnaire contains only those questions from the Citizens Advisory
Survey that pertained to our hypothesized statements.
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Office

107
Government
By using a check (X) mark, rate the performance of the
following government officials and former officials in
their jobs:
Excellent
(1 )

Good

Poor
O)

__
__
__
__
__
__

__
__
__
__
__
__

Senator Quentin Burdick
.__
Governor Arthur Link
__
Senator Milton Young
__
Governor William Guy
__
Tax Commissioner Byron Dorgan__
Congressman Mark Andrews
__
President Gerald Ford

Don't Know
(4)
__
__
__
__
__

Statistical Background
Please check the age group in which you belong:
___17 or under ___1 8 - 2 4 ___25-34 ___35-49

___50-64 ___65/over

Please indicate your sex:
___1.

Male

___2.

Female

How would you classify yourself politically?
___1. Republican___2. Democrat__ 3.

Independent ___ 4.

Don't
Know

Please check the occupation that most describes what you do:
___1.
___2.
___3.
___4.
__5.

Retired
Housewife
Professional
Educator
Executive, manager,
proprietor
__ 6 . Sales
___7. White collar, civil
service

8 . Skiller labor

9. Semi and Unskilled labor
10. Farmer
11. Student
12. Other (Specify) _______

To which, if any, of the following farm organizations do
you belong?
1. None

___2. Farmers U n i o n ___3. N F O __ 4. Farm Bureau

Do you belong to a labor union?
1.

Yes

2.

No
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Statist-leal Background-Continued
What is your church preference, if any?
___1. Protestant
2. C a t h o l i c __ 3. Jewish ___4. None
___5. Other (Please Specify)______________________________
Where do you live most of the year in North Dakota?
___1. Farm ___2. Town under 500
4. Town over 2,500

___3. Town 500-2,500

Political Developm enI
Appendix F
1972

North Carolina Ballot.

u-'J

MMOCflAIIC

r

f
SMSBIVt*

«tr'»*/4 S4 MW( !

ummm

V AI.SICW

uwmn

>

jo t*

|

r, m Hvitri

Tlwaw^ J ANDMlsON

TOR VYTUICWT I K k R T

A

/ •■]
\

| DEMOCRATIC

m i. iNistm ii

C^G^'CT^

i s u i t . iHMfKl, <•»!»(». Tr.»is«4

yJ

ballot

j¥

t'OR STRAIGHT TM K tT

mi. tmi* mtn
SUIf.
I **»*(*. To*w»%<9
BALLOT

mmmmmma
a

,

TO* STRAKMT 1KMT
ri LI TNI> lfc.UK

'.it, St<R. Mfr'l frujeiv, Y*»*i*9
y 1
BALI OT

3r

ir
»r««r
frlir^a

.1 r

CboM
O'OC

B A L L O T L EV E R S — Portion of sample Nov. 7 ballot shows that voters who
want t ; ic te o straight party tickets will have to puli two levers: one in the
presidential contest one! one for oil other races

SOURCE: Ferrel Guillory. Ballot Form May
Boast H.C. Ticket-Sp1ittinq (Arcata"~Mlcrofi1ra
Corp., NewsBank, Political Development, Card
--- -- -,190, September 1972), p. F9.

109

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
Agger, Robert E. "Independents and Party Identifiers: Char
acteristics and Behavior in 1952." In American Voting
Behavior, pp. 308-329. Edited by Eugene Burdick and
Arthur Bradbeck. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1959.
Agranoff, Robert. The New Style in Election Campaigns.
Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972.
Alexander, Herbert E. "Broadcasting and Politics." In The
Electoral Process, pp. 81-104. Edited by M. Kent
Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
Bean, Louis H. How America Votes in Presidential Elections.
New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968.
Berelson, Bernard R.; Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; and McPhee,
William. Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1954.
Bruce, Andrew. Non-Partisan League. New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1921.
Bryce, James. Modern Democracies. 2 vols. New York: The Mac
Millan Company, 1921.
Burdick, Eugene, and Bradbeck, Arthur J. American Voting
Behavior. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959.
Burnham, Walter Dean. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1970.
"
________. "The End of American Party Politics." In The Amer
ican Political Arena, pp. 248-262. Edited by Joseph R.
Fiszman and Gene S. Poschman. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1972.
Burns, James MacGregor. The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party
Politics in America. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963.
Ill

112
Campbell, Angus; Converse, P. E.; Miller, W. E.; and Stokes,
D. E. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, I960.
Campbell, Angus; Converse, P. E.; Miller, W. E.; and Stokes,
D. E. Elections and the Political Order. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1966.
Campbell, Angus, and Cooper, Homer C. Group Differences in
Attitudes and Votes. Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center,
1956.
Campbell, Angus; Gurin, Gerald; and Miller, Warren. The Voter
Decides. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1954.
Campbell, Angus, and Kahn, Robert L. The People Elect a
President. Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, 1952.
Cox, Edward F. Voting in Postwar Federal Elections: A
Statistical Analysis of Party Strengths Since 1945.
Dayton, Ohio: University Publications, Wright State
University, 1968.
Cummings, Milton C., Jr. Congressmen and the Electorate:
Elections for the U.S. House and the President, 19201964. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
Daudt, Dr. H. Floating Voters and the Floating Vote: A
Critical Analysis of American and English Election
Studies. Leiden, Holland: H. E. Stenfert., Kroese
N.V., 1961.
David, Paul T. Party Strength in the United States, 18721970. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1972.
DeVries, Walter, and Tarrance, V. Lance. The Ticket-Splitter:
A New Force in American Politics. Grand Rapids, Mich
igan: William B. Eerdams Publishing Company, 1972.
Flanigan, William H. Political Behavior of the American
Electorate. 2d ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972.
Flanigan, William H., and Zingale, Nancy H. Political Behav
ior of the American Electorate. 3d ed. Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1975.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960.
Gallup, George, and the American Institute of Public Opinion
Staff., comps. The Political Almanac, 1952. New York:
B. C. Forbes and Sons Publishing Co., Inc., 1952.

113
Gallup, George. The Gallup Poll, American Institute of
Public Opinion. 3 vols. New York: Random House,
1935-71.
Janowitz, Morris, and Marvick, Dwaine. Competitive Pressure
and Democratic Consent: An Interpretation of the 1952
Presidential Election. Ann Arbor: Bureau of Govern
ment, Institute of Public Administration, University
of Michigan, 1956.
Key, V. 0., Jr. American State Politics: An Introduction.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
________. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presi
dential Voting, 1936-60. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966.
Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. American Political Parties: Social
Change and Political Response. New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1970.
Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Berelson, Bernard R,; and Gaudet, Hazel.
The People's Choice. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1944.
McGinnis, Joe. The Selling of the President, 1968. New York:
Trident Press, 1969.
Matthews, Donald R., and Prothro, James W. "The Concept of
Party Image and Its Importance for the Southern
Electorate." In The Electoral Process, pp. 139-174.
Edited by M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Ziegler.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
Meyer, Alan S. "The Independent Voter." In Public Opinion and
Congressional Elections, pp. 65-77. Edited by William
N. McPhee and William Glaser. New York: Free Press,
1962.
Miller, Clem. Member of the House. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1962.
Morlan, Robert. Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League,
1915-1922. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1955.
Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leader
ship. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960.
Omdahl, Lloyd. Insurgents. Brainerd, Minnesota: Lakeland
Color Press, 1961.

114
Robinson, Elwyn B. History of North Dakota. Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
Slocum, Walter L. Occupational Careers. Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1966.
Journals
Belnap, George, and Campbell, Angus. "Political Party
Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy."
Public Opinion Quarterly 15 (Winter 1952):601-623.
Campbell, Angus, and Miller, Warren. "The Motivational Basis
of Straight and Split Ticket Voting." American Polit
ical Science Review 51 (June 1957):293-312.
Converse, Philip E.; Miller, W. E.; Rusk, J. G.; and Wolfe,
A. C. "Continuity and Change in American Politics:
Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election." American
Political Science Review 63 (December 1969):1083-1105.
Cowart., Andrew. "Electoral Choice in the American States:
Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces, and Divergent
Partisan Majorities." American Political Science
Review 67 (September 1973):835-853.
Cox, Edward F. "The Measurement of Party Strength." Western
Political Quarterly 13 (1960):1022-1042.
Edlersveld, Samuel J. "The Independent Vote: Measurement,
Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy."
American Political Science Review 46 (September 1952):
732-753;
Kostroski, Warren Lee. "Party and Incumbency in Postwar
Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and Models."
American Political Science Review 67 (December, 1973):
1213-1234.
Pomper, Gerald M. "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and
American Voters, 1956-1968." American Political Science
Review 66 (June 1972):415-428.
Rusk, Jerrold G. "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform
on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908." American Political
Science Review 64 (December 1970):1220-1238.
Talbot, Ross B. "North Dakota— A Two-Party State?" The North
Dakota Quarterly 25 (Fall 1957):93-103.
"Ticket-Splitting: Heavy Despite Nixon Landslide." Congressional Quarterly 30 (11 November 1972):2985.

115
"1970 Voting Patterns: Widespread Ticket-Splitting." Congres
sional Quarterly 29 (2 July 1971):1440-1442.
Magazines
"The Way People Voted--and Why." U.S. News and World Report,
20 November 1972, pp. 13-18.
Newspapers
"University of Michigan Reports Rise in Split-Tickets and
Drop in Balloting by Blocs." New York Times, 24 February
1957, p. 67.
Microform Reproductions
Guillory, Ferrel. Ballot Form May Boast N.C. Ticket-Splitting.
Areata Microfilm'Corp,, NewsBank, Political Development,
Card 190, September 1972.
Hills, Charles M. , Jr. Party Crossover Legal in State this
Election. Areata Microfilm Corp., NewsBank, Political
Development, Card 172, August 1972.
Spitzer, Dana. Ticket-Splitting Grows in St. Louis County.
Areata Microfilm Corp., NewsBank, Political Develop
ment, Card 223, October 1972.
Stone, Kirk. More Voters Splitting. Areata Microfilm Corp.,
NewsBank, Political Development, Card 191, September
1972.
United States Government Documents
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1974. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. United
States Census of Population: 1970. Vol. 1, Character
istics of the Population.
State Government Documents
North Dakota Legislative Blue Book, 1973. Published by legis
lative authority under the direction of Ben Meier,
Secretary of State.

116
Unpublished Materials
"Biographical Sketches of the 1975 Legislature." Compiled
by the Bureau of Governmental Affairs at the Univer
sity of North Dakota.
Hart, Peter D., and Research Associates, Inc., compilers.
"A Survey of the Political Climate in North Dakota."
April 1974.
Three 1974 North Dakota "Citizens Advisory Surveys."
Conducted by the Bureau of Governmental Affairs at
the University of North Dakota.

